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Biography
Nicole Oestreicher is an MA Candidate (Spring 2019) in Philosophy and Social Policy at American University. Her research interests are diverse, spanning across moral psychology, social and political philosophy, Nietzsche, American pragmatism, and the history of political theory, particularly Hannah Arendt. She is currently exploring alternative theories of dehumanization and human cruelty that do not rely on psychological essentialism and categorical thinking.

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Abstract
Jonathan Haidt’s social intuitionist model (SIM) poses the greatest challenge to traditional philosophical perspectives on moral judgment. SIM proposes that moral judgments are (1) primarily intuitive, (2) are justified via reason after the fact, and that such justifications are (3) primarily designed to influence others. This paper problematizes the following concepts in Haidt’s SIM: automaticity, rationality, reasoning, context independence and affective valence. Each of these concepts has bearing upon how one might construct and defend a conceptually precise defense – or critique – of rationalism, the philosophical view that reason is the principal source of knowledge (including knowledge of moral judgments) and that reasoning lies at the heart of our moral activities. By unbundling the various characteristics that psychologists and philosophers alike have bundled into their definitions of reason and intuition, I aim to (1) show how Haidt has not challenged the rationalist’s descriptive account to the extent that he claims, (2) demonstrate that the rationalist position remains defensible, and (3) add conceptual precision to subsequent empirical research on the efficaciousness of reason.

Keywords
Moral Psychology, Rationality, Automaticity, Moral Judgement, Intuition, Dual Process Model

Introduction
Contemporary moral psychologists have largely accepted that moral judgments are generated intuitively and automatically. At the end of the 20th century, influential work on automatic processes from researchers such as Bargh (1994) began to turn psychologists’ attention away from the predominating rationalist theories of moral development from Jean Piaget (1965) and Lawrence Kohlberg (1973), which focused on slow, deliberative moral reasoning. Still, this “automaticity wave” did not necessarily seriously challenge the role of moral reasoning in moral judgment; rather, it reflected a shift in the research interests in the scientific community that left moral reasoning’s role in moral judgment mostly untouched. However, Jonathan Haidt’s 2001 social intuitionist model (SIM) is widely considered to be the latest and greatest challenge delivered to the traditional notion that moral reasoning lies at the heart of moral judgment. Moral philosophers’ reactions to these findings have ranged from calls for caution to fierce skepticism, with many expressing concern for the descriptive account of moral judgment.
Social intuitionism is the view “that there are moral truths and that when people grasp these truths they do so...by a process more akin to perception” rather than reflection, and that these moral truths arise from interpersonal processes (Haidt 2001, 814). Because SIM proposes that moral judgments are (1) primarily intuitive, (2) are justified via reason after the fact, and that such justifications are (3) primarily designed to influence others, Haidt’s findings threaten the predominating rationalist concept of moral judgment. Some rationalist philosophers have replied to Haidt’s descriptive challenge by arguing that one must know “the why” behind a moral judgment, otherwise it falls short of what moral judgment necessarily involves (Kennett and Fine 2009; Annas 2011). Others have questioned what Haidt’s findings mean for the normative status of moral reasoning in moral judgment (Tiberius 2013), since Haidt’s findings may suggest that reasoned judgments make for worse moral decisions than intuitive ones. On the one hand, we tend to be more satisfied with the outcomes of our intuitively-made decisions when compared to reasoned ones (Wilson et al. 1993). On the other hand, automatic judgments can have egregious moral outcomes, as exemplified in countless cases of racial profiling and unconscious gender bias in academia. In such cases, reasoning can help course-correct these intuitions (Payne 2005).

My argument in this paper is twofold. In the first half, I will argue that Haidt’s SIM does not challenge moral reason’s descriptive role to the great extent that he claims. To address the descriptive challenge, I will first lay out Haidt’s key conceptual and descriptive claims, followed by several implicit descriptive claims. Then I will dispel the SIM’s implicit notion that automaticity and rationality are incompatible. To do so, it is important to draw a distinction between reasoning and rationality. Given this distinction, I argue that Haidt has challenged reasoning’s descriptive role, but he has not challenged rationality’s role in moral judgment. In the second half, I contend that it may be helpful to problematize two characteristics in Haidt’s account of reason – context independence and the absence of affective valence – because they have bearing upon how one might construct and defend a conceptually precise defense – or critique – of rationalism. Taken together, I want to show that it is necessary to “unbundle” the various characteristics that psychologists and philosophers alike have “bundled” into their definitions of reason and intuition in order to clarify, critique, or defend a rationalist position, and to conduct further empirical research on the efficaciousness of reason.
Haidt, SIM, and the Dual Processing Framework

To understand both the conceptual bundling issue and Haidt’s controversial claims, it is helpful to explicate the dual processing framework upon which his findings rest (see Table 1). The dual processing framework posits two distinct systems through which the mind produces cognition. System 1 features the automatic, effortless, rapid process of intuitions, while System 2 features the controlled, effortful, and slow process of reasoning.

Table 1
Haidt’s version of the dual processing framework (2001, 818)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The intuitive system (System 1)</th>
<th>The reasoning system (System 2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fast and effortless</td>
<td>Slow and effortful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Process is unintentional and runs automatically</td>
<td>Process is intentional and controllable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Process is inaccessible; only results enter awareness</td>
<td>Process is consciously accessible and viewable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does not demand attentional resources</td>
<td>Demands attentional resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parallel distributed processing</td>
<td>Serial processing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pattern matching; thought is metaphorical, holistic</td>
<td>Symbol manipulation; thought is truth preserving, analytical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common to all mammals</td>
<td>Unique to humans over age 2 and perhaps some language-trained apes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Context dependent</td>
<td>Context independent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Platform dependent (depends on the brain and body that houses it)</td>
<td>Platform independent (the process can be transported to any rule-following organism or machine)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Broadly speaking, contemporary rationalist philosophers and cognitive developmental psychologists that adhere to the dual process framework have claimed that our moral judgments are ultimately the products of reasoning (Piaget 1965; Kohlberg 1973). However, Haidt claims that moral judgments are actually the direct products of intuition. His model describes reasoning as a slow, effortful, conscious, and context-independent mental activity, while intuition is described as automatic, effortless, unconscious, and context-dependent, and accompanied by “affective valence” (i.e., positive and negative affects; good-bad, like-dislike) (2001, 818). Utilizing the dual
processing model, Haidt’s SIM deemphasizes reasoning and establishes the primacy of intuitions in the formation of moral judgments. He goes further to claim that reasoning is rarely the direct cause of moral judgments, as evidenced by the phenomenon of “moral dumbfounding,” or an inability of the moral agent to articulate any good reasons for the quick, emotionally charged intuitions they have at the moment of judgment. “I don’t know,” the moral agent says, “I can’t explain it, I just know it’s wrong” (Haidt 2001, 814). Thus, Haidt concludes that reasoning is more of a post-hoc phenomenon, bordering on outright confabulation, and holds the view that reasoning in such cases is causally ineffective in moral judgment.

Several philosophers have replied to Haidt’s first claim – that reasoning is rarely the direct cause of moral judgment – with the counterclaim that moral reasoning often plays a significant role in the modification of preexisting moral intuitions (Pizzaro and Bloom 2003; Kennett and Fine 2009). Others have also countered Haidt’s notion of reasoning as confabulation by pointing out a difference between private reasoning and public rationalizing: the latter is more of a social justification of spontaneous intuitions, the quality of which is dependent on the articulateness of the moral agent as judged by their peers, but it neither reflects the absence nor the inferiority of private reasoning in moral judgment (Saltzstein and Kasachkoff 2004). Haidt did later concede to Pizarro and Bloom’s contention, replying that there was indeed not enough evidence to definitively claim that reasoning is rarely the direct cause of moral judgment (Haidt 2003). However, Haidt’s critics have also failed to supply definitive evidence for their counterclaim – that reasoning is not rarely the cause of moral judgment – thus the debate over this point remains at an impasse.

But something still needs to be said about the role that intuitions play in moral judgment – namely, what intuitively-made judgments say about the moral agent and their moral development. For instance, if the moral agent directly arrived at a judgment via spontaneous intuition as opposed to slow deliberation, then that would raise the question to rationalists as to whether or not the moral agent was acting as a rational moral agent. Moreover, if definitive evidence at last confirmed that reason was rarely the direct cause of moral judgments, would that also mean that we rarely act as rational moral agents? If this question were answered affirmatively, then it would appear that the rationalists’ descriptive accounts of moral judgment and moral agency are incorrect, and Haidt’s SIM has upended our understanding of morality as we know it. While that may be the case, I argue that this radical upending of rationalism is dependent on the truth or falsity of the notion that automaticity and rationality are incompatible.
Automaticity, Reasoning, and Rationality

Haidt does not claim the incompatibility of automaticity and rationality explicitly in his work, but his SIM’s reliance on the dual processing framework suggests that he has implicitly committed to this idea. Recall that he describes reasoning as a slow, effortful, conscious, and context-independent mental activity, while describing intuition as automatic, effortless, unconscious, and context-dependent, and accompanied by affective valence. He then claims that reasoning is rarely the direct cause of moral judgment, the implied converse of which is that intuition is commonly the direct cause of moral judgment. Hence, Haidt has claimed that automatic processes, not voluntary rational processes, are the common direct cause moral judgment, and given that Haidt is operating on a dual processing framework, where cognitions are either the product of System 1 or System 2, it is implied that moral judgments cannot be both automatic and rational.

Indeed, reasoning is a conscious, slow, deliberate activity that is distinct from quick, unconscious intuition; however, the mark of rationality appears in unconscious, automatic processes. Several moral philosophers and moral psychologists (Pizzaro and Bloom 2003; Saltzstein and Kasachkoff 2004; Kennett and Fine 2009) have defended some form of the following argument as a rejoinder to Haidt: automatic intuitions are formed by habits, and habits are always formed and modified deliberately, hence intuitions are rational. Hanno Sauer (2012) offers a rigorous defense of rational intuitions by locating the rationality of moral judgment (a) not necessarily in the moment a moral judgment is made, (b) nor necessarily when reasons are demanded of the judge, but (c) necessarily when the moral intuition is habituated. Sauer’s account of intuitions as habits accommodates the role of automaticity in moral judgment and falsifies the claim that automaticity and rationality are incompatible:

Consider the example: I am riding home from work on my bike, and I do so, as it were, on autopilot. My unlocking the bike, my leaving the lot, my using the handle bar are all entirely automatic. But, of course, this sequence of automatic actions is not pointless, and it is not irresponsible to the tiny environmental features that change every day. Rather, these atomic actions all serve my goal – arriving at home. In fact, that I have this goal is why I have developed this particular sequence of habitual actions in the first place (2012, 264).

While conceding the fact that reasoning is not always “active,” but pointing out that the automatic actions trace back to an original rational root (i.e., the goal of going
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home), Sauer demonstrates that moral reasoning is still causally effective, and affirms the rationalists’ descriptive account of the rational moral agent as well as their moral development. In short, this defense of the rationalist account of moral judgment requires a distinction between reasoning and rationality, and that rationality cannot be exclusively bundled up with reasoning.

Some rationalists may claim that this unbundling of conscious reasoning from rationality does not successfully defend rationalism against Haidt’s challenge. Such a rationalist may concede that moral intuitions are rationally formed habits, but in order to challenge and replace an old intuition with a new intuition, one must have conscious access to the original reasons – “the why” – behind the old intuition. It is not clear in either Haidt’s challenge or Sauer’s reply that this access always appears in the modification of intuitions. Julia Annas (2011) articulates this traditional rationalist idea in her book *Intelligent Virtue*:

> With skills of any complexity, what is conveyed from the expert to the learner will require the giving of reasons. The learner electrician and plumber need to know not just that you do the wiring or pipe-laying such and such a way, but why. …lessons learned by rote could lead to disastrous mistakes. …The explanation enables the learner to go ahead in different situations and contexts, rather than simply repeat the exact same thing that was done… . Such a person understands what he is doing, unlike the person who can pick up a knack in a purely unintellectual way, without understanding what it is he is doing and why (19–20).

Here Annas also implies that automaticity and rationality are not compatible by claiming that “learning by rote” is not rational, or in her terms, it is not sufficiently so because it is largely unconscious. However, I would reply that the rationality of moral development essentially lies not in “the why” behind the intuition, but in actively attending to the external circumstances that “disrupted” the intuition. Consider the process of learning to play the piano: once I have habituated my playing of the piano, I do not experience piano-playing as “left ring finger on C-major, right index finger on E-major” and so on; I experience piano-playing as the totality of those discrete motions, by which I mean I no longer experience piano-playing in a conscious, step-by-step fashion. The only time I cease to experience my piano-playing as a totality is when I play a sour note: my total experience is interrupted. But when I hear the sour note, I do not necessarily need to attend to all the discrete motions involved in piano playing: usually all I need to do is
listen for the right note. It may even turn out that it was not my error. Perhaps there is nothing wrong with my hands, or my understanding of piano-playing: I may have just discovered a bum note in the piano I am playing. But I cannot discover this bum note by internally revisiting all of the original discrete motions involved in piano playing: I can only discover it by actively attending to the novel external details. That is a rational process. Consider this idea as applied to Haidt’s “moral dumbfounding” scenario:

Julie and Mark are brother and sister. They are traveling together in France on summer vacation from college. One night they are staying alone in a cabin near the beach. They decide that it would be interesting and fun if they tried making love. At the very least it would be a new experience for each of them. Julie was already taking birth control pills, but Mark uses a condom too, just to be safe. They both enjoy making love, but they decide not to do it again. They keep that night as a special secret, which makes them feel even closer to each other. What do you think about that? Was it OK for them to make love (2001, 814)?

Most of the participants in Haidt’s experiment automatically replied that it was wrong, even though Haidt reminded them that neither Julie nor Mark were harmed physically or emotionally, the danger of inbreeding was circumvented, and no one else knew about it (i.e., no harm was done to their families or extended community). But even after considering these details, these same participants still felt that it was wrong. I would argue that this cognitive dissonance between the intuitively-held moral principles (i.e., inbreeding is wrong, do no harm) and the actual circumstances results from the overpowering emotions that typically coincide with the thought of incest. However, such dissonance does not make these intuitive moral principles necessarily incorrect. Rather, they are more apparently at odds with the novel details that either physically did not appear or were simply left unattended (consciously or unconsciously) in the initial habituation of those principles. This is the bum note in the piano, and it can be found not by revisiting how we arrived at those original principles, but only by actively attending to novelty, which is a rational process.

This same idea is also observed in sports psychology:¹ several studies have found that athletes who suddenly were unable to throw a strike or hit a golf ball were more likely

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¹ See also Asia Ferrin (2017) for more examples of skillful actions and good moral judgments made without deliberation.
to return to optimal performance by focusing on the effects of their movements – what evidently changed – not the internal mechanics (Wulf and Sue 2007; Weiss and Reber 2012). By way of analogy, the original reasons are not always relevant in the modification of intuitions, therefore they are not essential to the rationality of intuitively-made moral judgments, and the distinction between reasoning and rationality holds. One could also argue that Annas’s account is in itself a habituated intuition about rationality that is at odds with novel empirical evidence, and habits are naturally loathe to novelty. Reasoning, too, Sauer observes, is performed habitually (2012, 269).

By untangling conscious reasoning from rationality, I have demonstrated that automatic, unconscious processes can be rational. While the clarification challenges a traditional rationalist idea that one must consciously know the why behind a moral judgment, it has not challenged the rationality of our moral judgments. In short, Haidt has not challenged the rational basis of our moral judgments, but he has challenged the reasoning behind moral judgments. “Rather than following the ancient Greeks in worshiping reason,” Haidt says, “we should instead look for the roots of human intelligence, rationality, and virtue in … intuition” (2001, 822). If by “reason” Haidt is referring to “reasoning” and “slow, conscious deliberation” then it is necessary to concede to and welcome this new point of inquiry. Still, this concession does not necessitate abandoning a rationalist position, should one choose to defend it. This new point of inquiry has simply introduced a new challenge: by separating rationality from reasoning and conscious knowing, Haidt and Sauer have also challenged rationalists of all stripes to reexamine and rearticulate what it means to know that something is right or wrong unconsciously. Given this unconscious or precognitive aspect, one may be tempted to abandon the rationalist position altogether. Nevertheless, such a rationalist account may not be impossible to articulate, provided that this new account admits a conceptual separation between reasoning and rationality. How such an account may solve the puzzle of “unconscious knowing,” however, is beyond the scope of this paper. In the next section I will turn to two more key characteristics of SIM that need to be unbundled from his accounts of reasoning and intuition: context dependence and affective valence.

**Affective Valence and Context Independence**

As previously defined, affective valence means the presence of a positive or negative emotion. Context dependence refers to the contextual variability of our social interactions, and because Haidt describes intuitions as shaped by our social interactions and the cultural context in which we participate, our intuitions are necessarily context
dependent. Further, Haidt’s SIM relies upon a dual processing framework, which frames the intuitive system and the reasoning system as diametrically opposed. Using this framework, Haidt describes intuitions as quick, unconscious, context dependent, and accompanied by “affective valence” (Haidt 2001, 818). However, by defining intuitions in this particular way and framing these two systems in a disjunctive fashion (i.e., moral judgements are either the product of reasoning or intuition), Haidt has insinuated that reasoning is not only slow and conscious, but also context independent and unaccompanied by “affective valence.” This sharp distinction that Haidt has drawn between reasoning and intuiting suggests that he has a very specific understanding of reasoning and intuition, which has implications for subsequent critiques and defenses of SIM. More specifically, if one defends Haidt’s SIM, then one has committed oneself to defending his particular construction of reasoning (unless otherwise specified), which I will show proves to be problematic.

First, this distinction suggests that cognitive empathy, or “the ability to consciously put oneself into the mind of another individual and imagine what that person is thinking or feeling” (Decety and Cowell 2015) cannot be included in the reasoning system: because it requires taking a person’s or group’s point of view, as well as emotional intelligence, empathy is necessarily context dependent and is accompanied by affective valence. But it also clearly cannot be included in the intuitive system. While some of us may engage in cognitive empathy more reflexively than others when attending to a moral dilemma, cognitive empathy is neither quick nor effortless: one must still actively attend to a variety of details, both introspectively and externally.

One may counter by admitting that cognitive empathy is clearly a kind of reasoning and that its implicit categorical exclusion from the reasoning system is unfortunate, but ultimately trivial: the dual processing system can account for affective valence in reasoning via affective empathy, which reflects the natural capacity to become affectively aroused by others’ emotions (Decety and Cowell 2015). Affective empathy, or affective arousal, has many intuitive features: it is quick, effortless, unintentional, common to all mammals, and context dependent. One may then say that affective empathy is a necessary condition of reasoning: another’s emotions must prompt some basic affect in the moral judge – be it wonder or worry – prior to the judge’s engagement in reasoning. Thus, affective valence is mostly accounted for in Haidt’s definition of reasoning, just in a roundabout and derivative way via affective empathy.

Indeed, affective empathy possesses the general features included in the intuitive system, and I grant that some basic affective empathy is a necessary condition for reasoning. However, affective empathy’s intuitive features do not make it an intuition.
As we have seen, intuitions are consciously and rationally formed by habits; affective empathy, on the other hand, is not. In sum, affective empathy, as defined here, is certainly a necessary condition for moral judgment, but it is not sufficient. To paraphrase Kohlberg, affective arousal is neither moral nor immoral: it only becomes moral when it is channeled in moral directions (1971, 230-231). Even if Haidt were to moderate his stance on affective valence’s relationship with reason in order to accommodate cognitive empathy, he still cannot include cognitive empathy in his account of reasoning by definition without moderating his stance on context independence. In short, this “roundabout way” of locating affective valence in reasoning via affective empathy is not sufficient. One needs to openly acknowledge that affective valence and context dependence cannot be exclusively tied to intuiting, otherwise it suggests that reasoning that is accompanied by affective valence and is demonstrably context dependent cannot be categorized as “reason.” I will show how this latter implication presents a number of issues for philosophers and psychologists alike.

Reasoning and “Impartial” Reasoning

Haidt describes intuitions as being context dependent, which is grounded in his social intuitionist account of moral judgment. He defines intuitive moral judgements as “evaluations (good vs. bad) of the actions or character of a person that are made with respect to a set of virtues held to be obligatory by a culture or subculture” (2001, 817). In other words, intuitions are context dependent because they are shaped by our social interactions and the cultural context in which we participate. This definition is not at odds with the account that describes intuitions as rationally formed (i.e., educated) habits. However, he defines reasoning as context independent, which suggests that reasoning takes place independently of social interactions.

“Context independent” can have two senses here. In one sense, it can refer to private reflection, where the moral agent is “mulling the matter over by themselves” in the absence of a pressing moral dilemma, as well as the absence of others’ input in their reasoning process (Haidt 2001, 819). “Context dependence” by contrast would refer to the immediate appraisal of a pressing moral dilemma – which would be akin to the affective valence that accompanies an emerging moral intuition – while in the presence of others. In another sense, “context independent” can mean “impartial” and “unbiased.” Note that reasoning’s context independence as it appears in the dual processing framework is not (and clearly cannot be) identical to Haidt’s claim that reasoning is biased, or that reasoning is guided by the agent’s motives, values, or coherent value
systems (2001, 821) – but it is related to that claim. Recall that reasoning, too, is habituated, and that intuitions in SIM are context dependent. “Context independent” in this second sense therefore most nearly refers to a particular kind of reasoning – an objective and impartial style of reasoning that not only structures the moral identity of the agent and the content of moral dilemmas in a specific way, but when applied to SIM it also suggests that the concept of reasoning itself has been conflated with a species of reasoning – impartial reasoning – that has been largely habituated by moral philosophers writing after Kant and Mill.

This conflation does not have significant bearing on the overall coherence on Haidt’s SIM per se, but it should challenge the foundations upon which his conclusions rest. More specifically, it is clear that these conceptual confusions can lead moral philosophers and psychologists to (a) misjudge and overstate the reliability (or unreliability) of reasoning, (b) misplace the justification for its unreliability, and/or (c) neglect “partial” or “context dependent” reasoning that relies on more intricate affective moral content (as manifested in the ethics of care) than objective moral content (as manifested in deontological ethics and consequentialism). For example, in an oft-cited study on the deleterious consequences of reasoning, participants in the experimental group were asked to evaluate two types of posters – a reproduction of an Impressionist painting and a humorous poster – and provide reasons for why they liked one poster more than the other (Wilson et al. 1993). The control group in the meantime engaged in a filler task and was not asked to reflect on their poster choice. When the groups were compared, the researchers found that the reflector group was more likely to select the humorous poster than the Impressionist poster, and the reflectors expressed greater dissatisfaction with their choice when researchers followed up with them a few weeks later to ask whether or not they still liked them. The study concluded that reflection can sometimes result in choices that we later regret.

While this is a helpful conclusion that rationalists should take seriously, it is somewhat overblown when one examines the details. First, in the breakdown of the types of reasons given by the reflector group, 54 percent of the reasons given were related to aspects of the poster content, while 22 percent of the reasons given concerned affective reactions or memories triggered by the poster (Wilson et al. 1993, 336). This suggests that some of the reflectors were engaged in different kinds of reflection, or attending to and privileging different kinds of content (i.e., objective content and affective content) in their reflective process. The researchers commented that it was overall easier for the test subjects to verbalize objective content (Wilson et al. 1993, 336). While the researchers also observed that test subjects who were knowledgeable about
art were less likely to change their minds, one also cannot help but note that it may be inherently difficult to verbalize the objective content of an Impressionist painting, which may suggest that objective reasoning specifically is not always effective in judgment. However, the study’s conclusion oddly does not differentiate between different kinds of reasoning; instead, its conclusion issues a broad injunction against reasoning, despite classifying different types of reasons during the experiment. Wilson et al. briefly admit that the kinds of reflection that focus on feelings do not disrupt people’s attitudes – in fact, they can sometimes strengthen them (Wilson and Dunn 1986; Wilson, Dunn, et al. 1989). Unfortunately, the study does not include a breakdown of the reasons provided by those in the reflective group who were satisfied with their choice (i.e., if their reasons privileged affective content over objective content). In sum, the study not only suggests that reasoning can sometimes result in detrimental decisions, but more nearly suggests that certain kinds of reasoning can result in detrimental decisions.

In light of the new questions that arise when we untangle the various conceptual confusions in moral judgment, it may be helpful for rationalists and their critics to untangle affective valence from intuition and reasoning from “impartial reasoning” in their discussions of moral judgment and moral responsibility. In doing so, we may be able to ask more precise questions about the strengths and weaknesses not only of reason, but of different species of reasoning in different contexts.

**Conclusion**

In this paper I have argued that Haidt’s SIM does not challenge moral reason’s descriptive role to the great extent that he claims. In the first half I laid out Haidt’s key conceptual and descriptive claims, followed by several implicit descriptive claims. I have also dispelled the SIM’s implicit notion that automaticity and rationality are incompatible by drawing a distinction between reasoning and rationality. Given this distinction, I have argued that Haidt has challenged reasoning’s descriptive role, but he has not challenged rationality’s role in moral judgment. In the second half, I contended that it may be helpful to problematize two characteristics in Haidt’s account of reason – context independence and the absence of affective valence – because they have bearing upon how one might construct and defend a conceptually precise defense of rationalism. Taken together, I have shown that it is necessary to “unbundle” the various characteristics that psychologists and philosophers alike have “bundled” into their definitions of reason and intuition in order to clarify, critique, or defend a rationalist position, and to conduct further empirical research on the efficaciousness of reason.
References


