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## The Epoche and the Intentional Stance

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### **Biography**

An element that ties all of my work together is a deep pluralistic impulse. Before beginning the study of philosophy at the New School for Social Research, the tradition in philosophy I was most aligned with was pragmatism. I am currently completing my master's thesis in philosophy of mind and phenomenology. In addition to my interest in epistemology and ontology, I have a secondary interest in ethical theories from antiquity. I find myself both interested in modern philosophy as a science (its intersection with the cognitive sciences) and antiquity's interest in ethics as how to live a life. In addition to my interest in ethics within antiquity, I have a specific affection for John Dewey's theories of democracy and education.

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# The Epoche and the Intentional Stance

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## Abstract

In this paper I explore the issue of intentionality by looking at the thought of Daniel Dennett and Edmund Husserl. I argue that despite the differences between Dennett's 'heterophenomenology' and Husserl's phenomenology, the two ways of viewing intentional content, and therefore consciousness, more broadly are not incompatible. I claim that we can view consciousness in a way that incorporates both the phenomenological and heterophenomenological methods. I begin by outlining Husserl's phenomenology before moving on to a description of Dennett's heterophenomenology. Next, I bring the difference in their thought into sharper contrast by exploring a criticism made by Hubert Dreyfus and Sean D. Kelly who put forward the claim that Dennett's heterophenomenology over-generates belief content and under-generates intentional content. I argue that this is an unfair criticism because Dennett's goal is to give a simple description of conscious states. Dennett is following Occam's razor exclusively in order to make claims about consciousness that can be backed up by the kind of verification characteristic of the natural sciences. For Dennett, under-generating intentional content is a strength. Conversely, I point out that there are many descriptions of intentional states that Husserl can account for which Dennett cannot. Lastly, in a final section I explore what a combination of the phenomenological method might look like if intertwined with a heterophenomenological method.

Since Dreyfus and Kelly's critique centers around belief attribution, I explore the following question: is intentionality possible without holding a belief about the intentional object? Dreyfus and Kelly claim that we can be intentional towards something without an 'I believe' being attached to what we are intentional towards. Related to this is how much of what has been considered consciousness by phenomenologists really comprises consciousness. Husserl sketches out a fuller consciousness than Dennett, and one that is achieved as an object of study through the epoche or phenomenological bracketing. The epoche shifts the view to 'pure consciousness' and away from the natural world. Dennett's heterophenomenology tries to achieve a study of consciousness through a third-person study of a subject's rational belief. For this reason naturalism, when it comes to the study of consciousness, is also a subject of investigation within my paper. I maintain in the final section that we can move back and forth between attempting a naturalistic view and conversely performing the epoche and exploring the wider territory this makes available to us.

## Keywords

Intentional Stance, Heterophenomenology, Phenomenology, Eidetic, Cogito, Ego Splitting, Phenomenological-Heterophenomenological Harmony

In this paper I take a look at the thought of Edmund Husserl; particular attention is paid to his work *Ideas: For a Pure Phenomenology*. Compared to this work is Daniel Dennett's "True Believers the Intentional Strategy and why it Works" as well as his essay "Whose on First: Hetero Phenomenology Explained." To engage with these two different ways of viewing consciousness, I will take issue with an argument made by

Hubert Dreyfus and Sean D Kelly in their 2007 paper entitled "Heterophenomenology: Heavy Handed Sleight-of-Hand." In this paper, Dreyfus and Kelly argue that Dennett's Heterophenomenology over-generates beliefs and under-generates intentional phenomena. By this, they mean Dennett does not take note of how consciousness can be directed without having a belief attached to this direction. To account for this, only a phenomenological, and not a heterophenomenological, set of concepts will do. I maintain, however, that while there are certain ways to understand consciousness that only phenomenological views can account for, there are other reasons a heterophenomenological view can be helpful.

To present this, I will draw from Husserl's *Ideas*. I will show what heterophenomenology as a system has no way of accounting for. Many of these notions are discussed at the very founding of phenomenology. These include ways of being intentional towards an object without having a belief about that object and the outer rim of a perception that we are focused on and its role in the way we interpret what we are focused on. In addition to this the method does not have direct accesses to different layers of reflection on reflections and/or fantasies of fantasies or memories of memories, The way fantasy plays a role in interpretation of an object and for intentionalities within these multi-layers of perception (higher and lower).

I will argue that just because Husserl can cover ground that explains parts of consciousness Dennett cannot, this does not mean that Dreyfus is correct about Dennett. It means instead that Dennett from a solely naturalistic perspective has found a way to have a natural science of certain aspects of consciousness. I will insist that the argument that he overpopulates and under-populates the conscious realm is unfair, showing instead that Dennett's view is a helpful tool in understanding the intentional content of human consciousness. My essay will consist of a defense of Husserl and phenomenology and a description of what only phenomenology tells us about consciousness, as well as how Dennett cannot explain these insights, and conversely a defense of Dennett. The last section then will be a look at how these two views of consciousness can live together in harmony, one hand washing the other.

I will begin with a description of the epoche and the phenomenological reduction, flow of consciousness and a very general view of intentionality before a description of the thought of Daniel Dennett. Following this Dreyfus and Kelly's argument will be laid out, and then a defense of Dennett against this argument, then a return to Husserl and what he gives specifically in contrast to Dennett, before a final section of phenomenological and heterophenomenological harmony.

If we are to follow Edmund Husserl into the place that led him to what would become phenomenology, we must first agree with him that eidetic universals while not having an address in space and time, do have a truth to them. By eidetic Husserl means something's generality or as he often writes, it's eidos. He uses the terms eidos or how it is eidetic to separate his thought from Kant or as he remarks, "The need to keep the supremely important Kantian concept of the idea purely separate from the general concept of the (formal or material) essence also moved me to alter the terminology. Thus I employ, as a foreign word, the terminologically little used eidos and, as a German word, essence" (Husserl 2014, 7). If we are going to take phenomenology in Husserl's sense seriously we must let ourselves believe that there can be a science that deals with the generality of objects. As he tells us "not, as a science of facts, but instead as a science of essences (as an 'eidetic science'), a science that aims exclusively at securing 'knowledge of essences' and no 'facts' at all" (Husserl 2014, 5). How does Husserl achieve this eidetic science of essences? With the epoche or phenomenological bracketing, this move on Husserl's part is along with intentionality the most central feature of phenomenology and what allows for a separate study of consciousness.

The goal of the epoche is to get to consciousness as such or the term Husserl prefers, 'pure consciousness.' To do this Husserl wants to bracket a certain view of the natural world. Therefore, consciousness embedded in the reduction focuses on consciousness only in its "sui generis" way of being. He writes that this is the "insight that consciousness in itself has a being of its own that is not affected in its own absolute essence by the phenomenological suspension. It accordingly remains as a 'phenomenological residuum,'" (Husserl 2014, 58). Husserl is then out to study consciousness in its uniqueness, but this is not a consciousness that is separate, though a strictly empirical world view is bracketed, it is not one cut off from the world and its objecthood, it in fact takes the world and the objects in it as its point of departure. For this reason Husserl will need to describe for us the unique way we encounter objects as our perceptions. We get a good example of this on page 60 of *Ideas* with a description of the object of a paper that is under a dim lighting, "This seeing and touching of the paper in perception, as a complete concrete experience of the paper lying here, and to be sure, of the paper given exactly with these qualities, appearing precisely with this relative lack of clarity, in this imperfect determinacy, in this orientation to me-is a cogito, an experience of consciousness" (Husserl 2014, 60). Here we are given a description of a paper but not purely as an empirical object, its chemical makeup does not change depending on the lighting, but a paper as it is conceived by our consciousness depends on the lighting. This paper is conceived specifically the way we conceive a paper in dim lighting. We also notice

here that just because the epoche has taken place it does not mean that phenomenology is not based on objects in the world, it in fact starts with these objects. This is Husserl's insight into the study of consciousness; we take the objects of perception, bracket the naturalistic conception of the world and what then comes into view is the phenomenal realm of the objects we are intentional towards.

It is important to think of this bracketing not as a one-time move for Husserl it has multiple layers. Husserl is a thinker of the layer, consciousness once this bracketing takes place comes into view as something like a very large cake. So bracketing happens throughout *Ideas* multiple times as he writes on page 58 of this work, "This operation will break down methodologically into various steps of 'suspension,' 'bracketing,' and so our method will assume the character of a step-by-step reduction" (Husserl 2014, 58).

Once a naturalistic view is bracketed, when we go to look at consciousness we do not see something that is still. Consciousness for Husserl is in a flow, what does he mean by this? How is consciousness a flow? We get a very clear description of this in "Philosophy as Rigorous Science," he writes that the psychical "appears as itself through itself, as an absolute flow, as a now and already 'fading away,' clearly recognizable as constantly sinking back into 'having been.'" (Husserl 1965, 43). Husserl goes on to describe that experience can be recalled in recollection and we can experience those recollections themselves, as well as recollections of those recollections and on and on. This is very important to Husserl, he writes in fact "In this connection, and this alone, can the a priori psychical, in so far as it is identical to such "repetitions" be "experienced" and identified as being" (Husserl 1965, 43). He goes on to write this creates the unity of consciousness that exists within the epoche outside of the naturalistic world of space and time, he calls this a "monadic unity of consciousness" (Husserl 1965, 43). Once a naturalistic view is bracketed we see what goes on within consciousness, what goes on within consciousness is a world of flowing connections, a stream of consciousness. Husserl continues describing this flow even more vividly "Looking back over the flow of phenomena in an imminent view, we go from phenomena to phenomena (each a unity grasped in the flow and even in the flowing) and never to anything but phenomena" (Husserl 1965, 43). An imminent view for Husserl is a view that sees our purified consciousness, as opposed to a naturalistic view. He refers to our phenomenal content, as unities because our perception of phenomena consists of many layers, these many layers are what are grasped and then become part of this flow, finally he reminds us that nothing enters into this flow but phenomena. It is a plausible view of what consciousness would look like once a naturalistic conception is bracketed. Once experiences of the phenomena enter

into a flow in their multi-faceted unity, a unity that does not consist of the paper in a naturalistic sense but the way we experienced it in the dim light, for example, this flows with other monadic unities one into the other fading in and fading out, backgrounds of one impression flowing with foregrounds of the next (as one possible kind of flow) and on and on.

Though Husserl studies consciousness in its uniqueness, it is not cut off from the world and its objecthood. We relate to the world in its objecthood by being intentional towards the objects. Intentionality is fundamental for Husserl because it is what relates a being to another being. Consciousness therefore is intentional; it is a being of encounter. Whenever we think we are thinking about something, Husserl tells us that this is without exception, or as he puts it “each currently actual cogito is to be consciousness of something” (Husserl 2014, 62). This has the added connotation that what we are currently conscious of is a direction towards something. It will be important for the argument later that this directedness is not necessarily a belief about what we are directed towards. Once we explain Husserl’s concept of doxis we will see that this relation between belief and non-belief will become more complex.

How does something such as our intentionality function once we have performed the epoche? Husserl explains this for us in *Ideas* when he writes, “the modified cogitation is equally consciousness, and consciousness of the same thing as the corresponding unmodified consciousness is. Hence the universal essential property of consciousness remains preserved in modification” (Husserl 2014, 62–63). After the epoche we still have within consciousness our directedness towards the world, in fact consciousness to a very high degree is this very directing. Husserl lays out for us later within *Ideas* “It is intentionality that characterizes consciousness in the precise sense of the term and justifies designating the entire stream of experience at the same time as a stream of consciousness and as the unity of one consciousness” (Husserl 2014, 161). Without intentionality, then the amorphous term consciousness would be unclear for Husserl, we get a ‘precise’ object of study from the introduction of this term. It is what lets experiences as a stream parallel the stream of consciousness and lets this stream of consciousness be a unified stream. Without intentionality we have no way to grasp the thing we call consciousness at all. Intentionality is not only an essential part of consciousness for Husserl, but it also helps distinguish what is specific about experiencing. He states, “The sphere of experiences in general is essentially distinguished by virtue of the fact that they all in one way or another have some share in intentionality, even if we cannot say of every experience in the same sense that it has intentionality as, for example we can say of every experience that comes into focus as an object of possible reflection that it is temporal” (Husserl 2014

161). He elaborates this further, writing that although the most fundamental element of what we experience is that it relates to the world, the sphere of our consciousness of experience is that it is almost always intentional as well.

For Daniel Dennett also, intentionality is a central concept, as he introduced it early on in his writing, most notably in his essay “True Believers The Intentional Strategy and Why it Works.” As the title of this essay alludes, belief will be central to the way Dennett will attempt to study consciousness. While for Husserl consciousness is grasped by the *epoche*, for Dennett third person belief attribution is the way he achieves a study of consciousness. As Dennett writes in a more recent essay, “Who’s on First: Heterophenomenology Explained,” “You *reserve judgment* about whether the subject’s beliefs, as expressed in their communication, are true, or even well-grounded, but then you treat them as *constitutive* of the subject’s subjectivity. (As far as I can see, this is the third-person parallel to Husserl’s notion of bracketing or *epoché*...” (Dennett 2003, 22). So for Dennett consciousness will be captured by third-person empirical belief attribution. This requires, however, some preliminary understanding of the sorts of beliefs one has. If we are to accept Dennett’s schema we must first believe in a common set of rational principles. While a common set of interests among agents may sound limiting, Dennett gives a compelling argument for it in his “True Believers,” that there are in fact some ways agents act that can be predicted quite accurately by belief attribution. It is difficult to argue against certain features of our behavior based on our physical composition or on our design. If someone leaves food we enjoy in a room after we have not eaten for seven days we will most likely eat that food, we could make a further prediction that if it is food we are not particularly fond of we are more likely to eat it in that situation. While this fact is based on our physical constitution as the kinds of things that need to eat to live, we can also understand some of what is going on in our heads at this moment by assuming we believe that eating this food is a good idea. This would be an example of performing the kind of rational belief attribution Dennett wants us to adopt, as he remarks, “first you decide to treat the object whose behavior is to be predicted as a rational agent; then you figure out what beliefs that agent ought to have, given its place in the world and its purpose” (Dennett 1987a, 17).

The example I have just proposed is simple but Dennett wants to persuade us that it works for situations that are more complex. Dennett even maintains that for situations that seem rather uncanny, parts of these situations can be broken down into this sort of belief attribution as he writes, “Suppose the US Secretary of State were to announce he was a paid agent of the KGB. What an unparalleled event! How unpredictable its

consequences! Yet in fact, we can predict dozens of not terribly interesting but perfectly salient consequences, and consequences of consequences. The President would confer with the rest of the Cabinet, which would support his decision to relive the Secretary of State of his duties pending the results of various investigations, psychiatric and political, and all this would be reported at news conferences to people who would write stories about it that would be commented on by editors" (Dennett 1987a, 25). This may seem a rather boring view of human behavior, when even the uncanny can be broken up into a bunch of predictable acts. It is not the act Dennett wants to draw our attention to, however, it is that through belief attribution we can perfectly predict the way people would behave in such a situation. Through this third person stance of belief attribution we come into contact with the believer's consciousness, a far more interesting prospect.

In order to show that this stance has the same kind of scientific legitimacy as other studies of the physical world, Dennett shows us how it is one that can be taken after two other stances have been applied, the physical stance, and the design stance. Dennett describes the physical stance when he writes "if you want to predict the behavior of a system, determine its physical constitution (perhaps all the way down to the microphysical level) and the physical nature of the impingements upon it, and use your knowledge of the laws of physics to predict the output for any input" (Dennett 1987a, 16). This is the sort of predictability philosophers have had strong attraction to since Rene Descartes, these are the rules of prediction within physics. Dennett goes on to say that physics itself sometimes falls short of what we want to predict within the physical world. He offers another 'stance,' this one he calls the 'design stance' remarking, "the design stance, where one ignores the actual (possibly messy) details of the physical constitution of any object, and, on the assumption that it has a certain design, predicts that it will behave as it is designed to behave" (Dennett 1987a, 16-17). Dennett gives the example of a computer remarking we do not know how computers run (most of us at least) but we know how to interface with them and can predict much of the way computers will run based on this information. Then if the design stance still cannot predict the behavior of what we are studying there is a chance we are studying something like us, something that makes choices based on rational interests. It is evident from these examples that what Dennett wants from the intentional stance is a theory as firm as the physical stance. He puts it in a succession after these other two stances in order to show there is firm scientific base for adopting this intentional stance. This is Dennett's attempt, almost as novel as Husserl's to reach a scientific theory of consciousness.



We may ask, what about the problem of belief attribution to those who act irrationally, who knowingly do things against their own interest? Dennett has an answer to this although he maintains “the [perverse] claim remains: all there is to being a true believer is being a system whose behavior is reliably predictable via the intentional strategy” (Dennett 1987a, 29). He readily acknowledges, “No one is perfectly rational, perfectly un-forgetful, all-observant, or invulnerable to fatigue, malfunction, or design imperfection. Since this is the case Dennett observes that we need a particular explanation for non-rational behavior. His answer is this: “the attribution of bizarre and detrimental desires thus requires, like the attribution of false beliefs, special stories” (Dennett 1987a, 20) This is Dennett’s answer on how to avoid this issue: sure there will be some things human beings do that we cannot predict with belief attribution but it will still be a story shot through with steps up until the one moment we cannot account for with acts we can attribute belief attribution to. Dennett maintains that since “One is not supposed to need an ulterior motive for desiring comfort or pleasure or the prolongation of one’s existence,” (Dennett 1987a, 20) this kind of attribution is possible. So for Dennett our false beliefs require special stories, and these stories consist for the most part of true beliefs.

In his more recent essay “Who’s On First? Heterophenomenology Explained,” Dennett defends his intentional stance in light of many of the counter arguments that have been introduced in the twenty years between the two essays. This work is a development of his intentional stance, which is the main element of his heterophenomenology (meaning phenomenology of another not one’s self). Dennett wants to more clearly define why this is desirable by writing that “if you have conscious experiences you don’t believe you have –those extra conscious experiences are just as inaccessible to you as to the external observers” (Dennett 2003, 3). He is maintaining here that without beliefs we cannot make sense of the intentional content. Belief-hood then is another requisite for Dennett, in order for something to be considered a naturalistic object of study. In contrast to the inclinations of Husserl in phenomenology, Dennett maintains that “You are not authoritative about what is happening in you, but only what seems to be happening in you” (Dennett 2003, 4).

Recently, Herbert Dreyfus and Sean D. Kelly have engaged with Daniel Dennett. Both Dreyfus and Kelly hold phenomenological views, which were influenced by Husserl and many of the phenomenologists who followed in his footsteps (though none followed Husserl to the extent he would have liked to see). They maintain that Dennett falls prey to a similar dysfunction, although avoiding a phenomenon they see as problematic in later Husserl: Ego splitting. Ego splitting, Husserl in the *Cartesian Meditations*, consists

of “the phenomenological Ego establishing himself as disinterested onlooker, above the naively interested Ego”(qtd. in Dreyfus and Kelly 2007, 34, *Cartesian Meditations*). Dreyfus and Kelly take issue with this notion. If we followed this later Husserl, Dreyfus and Kelly claim, we would distort the experience we were interpreting; it is like “dancing while observing where one is placing one’s own feet”(Dreyfus and Kelly 2007, 46). Husserl’s later view that we can split our Ego in order to study it, is in this view naïve. They maintain that Dennett avoids this ‘transforming through reflection’: “The subject studied by the heterophenomenologists does not have to reflect in order to report on his experience, so the heterophenomenologists can legitimately take utterances of his subjects to be unreflective reports on all and only the content of their experience” (Dreyfus and Kelly 2007, 47). While the Heterophenomenologist’s third person stance avoids this ego-splitting distortion, it unfortunately falls to an equally destructive distortion of its own.

According to Dreyfus and Kelly, Dennett falls into this trap by attributing an ‘I believe’ to everything we are intentional towards. How can one be intentional towards something they have no belief about? The notion that we can be intentional toward something we have no belief about was first articulated by Husserl. We get a description of this in *Ideas*: “consciousness in general is so fashioned that it is of twofold type: prototype and shadow, positional consciousness and neutral consciousness. The one is characterized by the fact that its doxic potentiality leads to doxic acts that actually posit something; the other by the fact that it permits only shadow images of such acts” (Husserl 2014, 225). Belief is quite important for Husserl as well as Dennett, it is intentionality’s most basic form, Husserl refers to this as originary doxic. There are cases that are modifications on this originary doxis which is what the above quote refers to. While some of our intentional experience actually posits something that is doxic or as we might say holds a belief, we can also hold an ‘I don’t believe.’ Others are not as straight forward in holding something clear that would correspond with an ‘I believe,’ but they are neutral in terms of the belief or disbelief.

In order to describe this notion of being intentional towards something without having a belief about it, while also describing another notion, ego-submersion, absent in Husserl, Dreyfus is fond of Sartre’s example of when someone is running towards a street car, he remarks when running towards a street car we are directed towards this object but there is no I, so there can be no ‘I believe,’ only a directedness towards our intentional object. If it is the case that Dennett cannot account for intentionality without a belief tied to it, if we are to follow Dreyfus and Kelly in this claim, it is a major blow to his conception of consciousness. As we have seen earlier, in order to have

Heterophenomenology we need the intentional stance, and the intentional stance relies on belief attribution. This is a deep structural problem with this account of consciousness. As they write, “instead of simply recording the subject’s utterance ‘getting closer’ the heterophenomenologist writes down for example ‘the subject believes he is getting closer’” (Dreyfus and Kelly 2007, 47). Therefore, utterances by a subject get tied to beliefs, these utterances may have no belief tied to them at all. To utter something is not the same as being able to attribute a belief to it, whereas unfortunately Dennett’s method would lead someone to the false conclusion that they do. According to Dreyfus and Kelly, “If the heterophenomenologist takes his notes to be his data, as Dennett insists, the heterophenomenologist is not just conveniently attributing the assertion, ‘getting closer,’ to the subject; he claims the subject is expressing a belief he actually holds” (Dreyfus and Kelly 2007, 48). This results in the heterophenomenologist treating “the subject’s reports as if they were the result of reflection” (Dreyfus and Kelly 2007, 48). Dennett’s system then is one always putting too many “I believes” in our conscious experience. In thinking he could overcome the singular aspect of phenomenology, he instead ended up with an inaccurate picture of consciousness, one over-crowded with beliefs in places where there are none.

In addition to over-generating beliefs, Dreyfus and Kelly’s other claim is that he under-generates intentional content. The reason for this is part and parcel with the reason Dennett is accused of over-generating beliefs. If his heterophenomenology can only account for beliefs, it may potentially both over-generate how much of our intentional content is beliefs, while at the same time not accounting for content that is outside of this framework of belief. One of the mental phenomena this way of viewing things cannot account for, according to Dreyfus and Kelly, is the way we experience products in the environment. As they write, “insofar as the heterophenomenologist fails to capture the subject’s way of experiencing objects or properties, he excludes a vast array of intentional content” (Dreyfus and Kelly 2007, 50). They further clarify by explaining that there are some experiences of objects and properties that are not identical with beliefs one has about experiencing these objects and properties. To believe we are having an experience does not suffice to explain experiencing as such. As they write, “if the subject were to believe he was having the experience instead of merely having it, the intentional content of the experience would be different” (Dreyfus and Kelly 2007, 51). According to Dreyfus and Kelly Dennett does not allow for the existence of qualitative experience, or what is sometimes called qualia they write, he argues “against qualia on the grounds that they are completely inaccessible to us except through the beliefs we have about them” (Dreyfus and Kelly 2007, 51). This puts beliefs and not experiences to the forefront of

Dennett's theory of mind. Dreyfus and Kelly hammer in this point further by returning to the theme they brought out with the streetcar example, "Affordances draw activity out of us only in those circumstances in which we are not paying attention to the activity they solicit. As we have seen already, this is how they are not like beliefs" (Dreyfus and Kelly 2007, 52). In the account they hold that objects and activities have normative qualities that cause us to react to them and have intention towards them without holding belief about them, the example they use is a large painting making us step backward. The fact that Dennett over-generates beliefs then is linked to the fact he under-generates intentional experience. Dreyfus and Kelly make this explicit: "If this account of the normative aspects of phenomenology is right, then we have isolated a whole range of intentional phenomena that the heterophenomenologist method in principal excludes" (Dreyfus and Kelly, 54).

Dreyfus and Kelly's argument does not meet Dennett on his own ground. While it is true that from a certain perspective he does indeed over-generate beliefs and under-generate intentional phenomena, this claim ignores what he is trying to achieve. Dennett wants to find a method for describing phenomenal content that stays within a naturalistic framework. To say he under-generates intentional phenomena is just to translate what he sees as a virtue into a weakness. Dennett wants to find a way to naturalistically verify intentional content; if he can only capture certain intentional content through his method, this for Dennett is the best we can do at this particular junction in history. His method is set up along the lines of Occam's Razor, he is looking for simplistic intentional content because he believes it will yield the most verifiable results. The claim that Dennett over-generates beliefs is then a more serious claim than that he under-generates intentional content. For from his point of view if his heterophenomenological method captures less intentional content, there is a problem with the content that is not captured, not with his method.

We can see an example of this in Dennett's "*Setting Off on the Right Foot*," which introduces his collection of essays *The Intentional Stance*. Dennett introduces criticism made by Thomas Nagel, who he uses as his anti-realist foil in order to show his perspective on topics such as qualia. Dennett quotes Nagel as writing "the attempt to give a complete account of the world in objective terms detached from these perspectives inevitably leads to false reductions or to outright denial that certain patently real phenomena exist at all" (qtd. in Dennett 1987b, 5, *Nagel The View from Nowhere*) Dennett's reply to this quote of Nagel's could double as an answer for Dreyfus and Kelly: "My intuitions about what 'cannot be adequately understood' and what is 'patently real' do not match Nagel's. Our tastes are very different. Nagel, for instance, is oppressed by the desire to

develop an evolutionary explanation of the human intellect (78–82); I am exhilarated by the prospect. My sense that philosophy is allied with, and indeed continuous with, the physical sciences grounds both my modesty about philosophical method and my optimism about philosophical progress” (Dennett 1987b, 5). Dennett does not wince at Nagel’s critique. He does not deny he is a reductivist. He maintains, however, contrary to Nagel’s ‘taste’ this is a strength.

Dennett even entertains the idea that the “orthodoxy of his scientific starting point might [even] be due to social and political factors” (Dennett 1987b, 7), although for the most part brushing this aside. He next mentions a critique by Nagel which states that Dennett is quick to try and ground phenomena that require more openness, or ‘confusion’ than Dennett is willing to give them. Dennett responds with yet another statement that can help us put Dreyfus and Kelly’s engagement with him into greater perspective. Dennett states, “My tactical hunch, however, is that even if this is so, the best way to come to understand the situation is by starting here and letting whatever revolutions are in the offing foment from within. I propose to see, then, just what the mind looks like from the third-person, materialistic perspective of contemporary science” (Dennett 1987b, 7). Dennett then readily admits there may be phenomena his method cannot account for, he just has a ‘hunch’ or is favorable towards the kinds of results that will come out of his third person method. If there are intentional phenomena that cannot be grounded in this way it does not bare on his method much at all, nor do the motives behind adopting the method effect his choice to adopt it. It is only that the results come from this third person method which he attributes as being a part of the empirical sciences. In Dennett’s thoughts within *Heterophenomenology Explained*, he writes if we have conscious experiences we do not believe we have, they are inaccessible to ourselves as well as others. We have seen that the under-generation of intentional content is something that Dennett’s system produces by design and so attacking his heterophenomenology because of this, though pointing towards the existence of a different way to view consciousness, critiques his system from within different rules of engagement. It is not that Dennett’s system does not account for this phenomena, it is that he is unwilling.

What about the claim that Dennett over-generates beliefs? This becomes a bit less of a problem if we understand that the two claims that he both under-generates intentional phenomena and over-generates beliefs are linked. It is not that Dreyfus and Kelly are claiming he creates new intentional phenomena that do not exist. They are rather claiming that he puts a ‘the subject believes’ in front of actually existing intentional phenomena that are not necessarily beliefs. This claim, unlike that he under-generates

intentional content cannot be explained away. However, we can just present Dennett's point mentioned above, that these are in fact beliefs. So these under-generated bits of content are all 'I believes' for Dennett, but within his heterophenomenological view they make sense. If Dennett was more open to qualitative experience, he could avoid this later problem while still keeping the framework of his method intact.

Thus far we have been introduced to Edmund Husserl and Daniel Dennett's philosophy and to critics of Dennett's thought and responded to them in defense of Dennett. On the converse of this defense, there is a very large ground of intentional phenomena Dennett does not account for. Although Dreyfus and Kelly do not attack Dennett on his own grounds, such an attack helps us to see the ground he does not cover. Another way of saying this would be to remark they are correct in saying there is much intentional phenomena he cannot account for whether or not his system is designed specifically to only account for certain intentional phenomena. We can argue that it is worth keeping this vast array of phenomena skipped over by Dennett, while also maintaining some results captured Heterophenomenologically give us a different kind of verifiability. To see all of the phenomena Dennett cannot account for we return to Edmund Husserl's ideas. We began by showing certain aspects of Husserl's thought, the most fundamental of which include the epoche or phenomenological reduction, the flow of consciousness as well as intentionality. We will now view in more depth some of Husserl's other conceptions, with a new eye towards the fact that a heterophenomenologist method cannot account for them.

A purely empirical method of understanding an object will never be able to directly account for the role fantasy plays in our interpretation of an object. For instance if you see the front of a coffee cup I am holding, you can already have in your head an image of what the back of the coffee cup looks like, even if you have never seen the back of this particular coffee cup. In this way our perceptual history plays a role in interpenetrating of the object. What is more you may have a specific emotional connection to the brand of coffee I am drinking, this affection effects the way your consciousness is intentional towards the cup. In *Ideas* we get the more Husserlin example of geometry, "the geometer operates incomparably more in fantasy than in perception of a figure of model" (Husserl 2014, 121). Husserl wants us to understand that mathematics deal in ideals, for example a perfect circle, which cannot be comprehended without the use of fantasy. He goes on further to tell us, "Even where something is "contemplated" by looking at the figure, the newly initiated processes of thinking have as their sensory underpinning the processes of fantasy, the results of which secure the new lines on the figure" (Husserl 2014, 126). If we are to engage with the idea of a shape, even if we are basing it on a shape in the world,

we have our fantasy of what the figure looks like as we draw the new line onto the figure. What one goes about when engaged in geometric thinking cannot be a way of thinking that refers only to empirical examples; this is also the case for phenomenology. Imagination then and our history with objects in the world color our relationship with new objects. As Husserl remarks, “Extraordinary profit is to be drawn from the offering of history and, in even richer measure, from what art and, in particular, literature have to offer” (Husserl 2014, 127). History and literature help to bring up imaginative functions towards the world around us and therefore add dimension to objects that otherwise seem only explicable empirically. There is no way for a third-person perspective to account for the way fantasy could effect intentional content in a manner where we can isolate how they are doing the effecting.

If we look at an object we are not just seeing the object we are intentional towards, but instead we are picking up other things in our view other than what we are intentional towards. Husserl’s phenomenology can account for this, while a third-person perspective to what we are conscious of, one that needs an ‘I believe,’ cannot. How could we believe something that enters our consciousness with out us knowing it? It seems clear, although Dennett denies the verifiability of this claim, that things enter our mind without our knowledge. For Husserl noema is the “actual components of intentional experiences” (Husserl 2014, 173) and noesis are there “intentional correlates” (Husserl 2014, 173). Husserl has a parallelism between an object side of intentional experience and a purely intentional side. Within this object side of our intentionality, there is a core we perceive. As he recounts, “Within the noema in its entirety, we have to sort out essentially diverse layers that group around a central ‘core,’ around the pure ‘objective sense’” (Husserl 2014, 181).

Finally, Husserl’s phenomenology can account for fantasies of fantasies and memories of memories and reflections of reflections something a third-person intentional stance could not. How does Husserl account for the fact that we can have a fantasy of a fantasy? He gives us the example of turning towards a picture in a gallery that is only in our memory, writing that we can be “Turned towards the ‘picture’ (not the depicted), we apprehend nothing actual as an object but instead just a picture, a *fictum*. The “‘apprehension’ is the actual process of turning towards the object, but it is not ‘actual’ apprehended is ‘as though it were the case,’ the positing is not a current positing but instead a positing modified in the ‘as though it were the case’ fashion,” (Husserl 2014, 220). We see from this example then we could be not actually in a gallery but in a memory of the gallery. In this memory, it is possible that what we remember is not the same, but we can still move around within our conscious remembering. This is how

we can have a memory of a memory. It is impossible to imagine getting third-person verification on something such as a memory of a memory, as there is no way this could be reported to a third party with any kind of accuracy which captures this phenomena.

What would a combination of phenomenology and heterophenomenology look like? It might be maintained that putting them together is a Sisyphean task. If we understand both phenomenology and heterophenomenology as shifts in view point in order to capture consciousness, we could potentially understand the possibility of a phenomenology/heterophenomenology as the possibility of looking at one object of study, consciousness, from different viewpoints. One viewpoint, phenomenology, is the viewpoint that involves the epoche and phenomenological bracketing. For this viewpoint we capture a vast array of subjects. If we want a method that has the most dynamism in capturing the content of intentional experience we should perform the epoche and take up the phenomenological method. If we are interested in a naturalistic definition of conscious experience but one that is limited, we can switch to the intentional stance. These two could even be used for the same phenomena. For example, if we start with the heterophenomenological view that 'we believe we saw a painting in the Whitney Tuesday at 9pm last week' and report this to the heterophenomenologist, we get a certain understanding of our conscious experience by using this method. We can also infer from the heterophenomenological other results from 'I deduce x.' We know that we do not believe that we were anywhere else at this time. Once we hit this point, whether or not we have exhausted our possibilities within the heterophenomenological view, we can thank the party who helped us in this third-person belief attribution and take these results to then perform the epoche. We now explore the same experience from a phenomenological perspective and realize that this painting at the Whitney and the whole interpretation of it as an empirical object was influenced by a person wearing a red shirt standing next to the painting we were not focused on but who entered our consciousness. Also we were influenced by the view of a painting we saw at 8:45 previously. This experience through our flow of consciousness got caught up with the experience of looking at the painting we saw at 9 and we can then understand the way our conscious experience followed from our experience with the painting we saw at 8:45 to my memory of the painting at 9 (this is only one of countless possibilities).

We can also use the two different views for different phenomena we think they are better suited to. The heterophenomenological intentional stance may do us well for deciding certain data about the reason why someone behaves a certain way based on belief attribution that lets us assume certain things about their conscious intentionality about this experience. If someone eats at 6 o'clock every day we can assume they do



this because “they believe they are hungry” at this time or “they believe it is a good idea to have a regular schedule.” If we want to explore how objects manifest themselves in memory or fantasy and what role intentional experience has towards these objects we can perform the epoche and try to look at consciousness flow between these intentional experiences and fantasy elements or memories of these experiences. We may employ this to explore other phenomena more fully as well since heterophenomenology does not have a way to account for nomadic cores of phenomena, and the way edges of phenomena factor into us being intentional towards these phenomena. We would employ these phenomenological methods in a more general fashion and less specifically to situations that do not necessarily deal with places where we can find norms and standards of rational belief attribution. This could be anything since there is no phenomena after the epoche is performed that cannot be looked at.

We can then have both a phenomenological and heterophenomenological view. Although this way of viewing consciousness has not been developed much herein it is the subject that warrants investigation more fully.

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