Distinguishing Morality from Convention: Evidence for Nativism

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Biography
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Abstract
Many moral psychologists, inspired by Noam Chomsky’s work in linguistics, have attempted to offer Poverty of the Stimulus (PoS) arguments for moral nativism. In this essay, I consider one important line of evidence known as the “moral/conventional distinction,” which nativists have used to support their PoS arguments. I argue that this distinction is not only real, but likely very abstract and sophisticated, such that the early recognition of this distinction in children across cultures constitutes an important line of evidence on which to ground a PoS argument for moral nativism. The paper is divided as follows: Section I briefly summarizes Chomsky’s work and its integral role in the revival of nativism in cognitive science. Sections II and III review the large body of work, started by psychologist Elliot Turiel, on the moral/conventional distinction, examining Turiel’s characterization of the distinction and presenting two possible models of the cognitive structures involved in moral judgments. Section IV considers a variety of criticisms of Turiel’s view of the moral/conventional distinction. Section V argues that, though Turiel’s view is vulnerable to several serious objections, there is still good reason to accept his claim that the moral/conventional distinction is a real distinction that children recognize from an early age. I suggest some ways in which Turiel’s characterization should be modified in light of objections. Section VI presents several difficulties for empiricist explanations of the early acquisition of the moral/conventional distinction. These difficulties suggest that the distinction is the right kind of evidence for a PoS argument for moral nativism. Section VII concludes the paper.

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1. Nativism and the “Chomskian Revolution”

Noam Chomsky’s pioneering work in linguistics in the 1950s and 60s has led to a nativist resurgence in the cognitive sciences. Before saying too much about Chomsky’s work, let me first say a few things about nativism. Nativism is perhaps best understood when contrasted with empiricism. On the empiricist view, human beings enter the world as blank cognitive slates, equipped only with general purpose learning systems, which we then use to acquire all of our ideas, principles, concepts, knowledge, etc., through experience. Nativists deny that we begin life as blank slates and claim that we come equipped with some domain-specific cognitive structures.

Chomsky argued forcefully for a nativist view of language. He offered a radically new approach to linguistics, an approach which has been exported to many other areas of cognitive science, including moral psychology. Prior to Chomsky, if one was to ask what linguists study, the answer would have been, perhaps unsurprisingly, language. Linguists believed their job was to study languages, and it was thought that the way to do this was to study the linguistic behavior of speakers of these languages, looking for regularities, understanding the circumstances in which utterances are made, and observing the effects of such utterances.

Chomsky argued that this approach is entirely wrong because linguistic behavior is influenced by so many idiosyncratic factors that it would be futile to look for interesting regularities. He proposed instead that linguistics should be primarily concerned with studying the cognitive structures involved in linguistic behavior (e.g., speaking and understanding other speakers’ utterances). A cognitive structure is something of an abstraction, but it is best thought of as a psychological process, or an organized set of psychological processes, structured to respond to various inputs and to produce certain outputs. It is also thought to contain (either representationally or structurally) information relating to the target domain, which Chomsky often loosely refers to as “knowledge.” For example, a cognitive structure involved in language would include a set of psychological processes organized to respond to linguistic input (e.g., other speakers’ utterances) and to produce linguistic output (e.g., the speaker’s own utterances).

When Chomsky began his work, the received view in linguistics was that language acquisition is simply an induction problem, one of inferring from linguistic data what words mean and how they are strung together into sentences. On this picture, learning a language is simply a matter of applying general purpose learning mechanisms (e.g., mechanisms involved in induction) to the linguistic domain. However, Chomsky argued that some cognitive structures involved in language acquisition are “domain-specific.” A structure is domain-specific if it is structured to respond solely to the input of a particular...
domain and to produce output specific to that domain. For example, a structure designed specifically for language acquisition would only respond to linguistic data and not, perhaps, to non-human animal sounds.

Chomsky referred to the cognitive structure(s) exercised in the linguistic domain as the “Facility of Language” (FL). It is difficult to say precisely how this faculty should be understood, but roughly, FL is whatever it is in the mind/brain\(^1\) that enables humans to develop what Chomsky calls “linguistic competence.”

Linguistic competence is best thought of as what a person knows when he or she knows his or her native language. It can be contrasted with linguistic “performance,” i.e., the ways in which such knowledge is put to use in speaking and comprehending utterances. To illustrate the distinction, consider the sentence, “Bob thinks that Bill should stand up for himself.” My knowledge that the reflexive pronoun “himself” must denote Bill is part of my linguistic competence as an English speaker, whereas my act of uttering this sentence would be a linguistic performance. Chomsky thought we could effectively study linguistic competence by gathering samples of native speakers’ judgments about their languages, referred to as “acceptability judgments.” In these studies, participants are presented with a variety of sentences and asked to judge which ones they think are grammatical and which are not.

Chomsky believed this information was important for three primary reasons. First, sampling acceptability judgments helps us study the degree of complexity of our grammars. If subtle differences in sentence structure seem to affect whether a sentence is judged to be grammatical, then we have reason to believe that the grammars participants are using in forming their judgments are highly complex. Second, by sampling the acceptability judgments of young children, we can see how early in childhood development grammars begin to form. Finally, we can study the acceptability judgments of speakers of a variety of languages to see how a speaker’s linguistic background affects his or her grammatical judgments.

Although linguists have not reached a consensus on the strength of the nativist position, a large body of research suggests that: (1) individuals’ grammars are highly complex and can only be specified in terms of abstract rules;\(^2\) (2) grammars emerge early

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1. I am using the term “mind/brain” so as to avoid any particular commitment to the relationship between the mind and the brain.
2. Linguists disagree about whether these rules are actually in the FL. At least in his early work, Chomsky seems to have thought that FL contains innately specified rules. Others, however, contend that while speakers’ acceptability judgments exhibit regularities which are best described in terms of rules, the regularities are not
in the normal course of human development, around five or six; and, (3) the range of grammars found across the human species is highly constrained. Chomsky has argued that it is very unlikely that all normal children could develop such complex grammars in a short span of time using only general purpose learning systems and the linguistic data plausibly available to them. Given the linguistic input children receive, their output greatly exceeds what we would expect on empiricist assumptions. This kind of argument, that the output in a given domain exceeds the input given empiricist assumptions and that the output is therefore best explained by positing a domain-specific faculty, is referred to as a Poverty of the Stimulus (PoS) argument.

The influence of Chomsky’s approach has extended far beyond linguistics. Some researchers in moral psychology have argued that there are significant parallels between language and morality and that a Chomskian approach to morality will prove fruitful. Furthermore, a number of theorists have argued that moral competence is best explained by positing an innate moral faculty. For example, Dwyer (1999) makes use of research on the moral judgments of children to develop a PoS argument for moral nativism.

2. Evidence of an Innate Moral Faculty

It is not my intention here to try to assess how strong the analogy between language and morality is or to give any satisfyingly precise definition of what a “moral faculty” is supposed to be. When I say that the capacity to make moral judgments is “innate,” I just mean that it is not acquired entirely from experience. Much more could be said about what is involved in this claim, but for the purposes of this paper, a broad characterization of the concept will suffice. Although conceptual questions are important in assessing the moral nativism debate, I think it is equally important to consider the lines of evidence that nativists have offered to support their claims, which will be my primary concern here.

Compared to linguists, moral psychologists have offered relatively few lines of evidence for moral nativism, but one potentially compelling piece of evidence that has been put forth relates to what is called the “moral/conventional” distinction. Although
characterizations of this distinction can be traced all the way back to Aristotle, the formulation that is most relevant to the nativism debate is one which has been developed by an extensive research program started by the psychologist Elliot Turiel in the 1970s. Roughly, Turiel’s claim is that at an early age, children consistently make judgments that fall into two distinct conceptual domains, the moral domain and the conventional domain. This pattern is thought to continue into adulthood and to be pan-cultural. While Turiel himself has not used this research to support nativist arguments, others such as Susan Dwyer (1999), John Mikhail (2000), and Gilbert Harman (2000) have argued that the moral/conventional distinction is not something that children could acquire from the moral “data” plausibly available to them. On their view, the moral/conventional distinction offers powerful evidence on which to ground a Poverty of the Moral Stimulus Argument.

In what follows, I will elaborate on the moral/conventional distinction as it has been developed by Turiel and his followers, and then consider a variety of criticisms it has received. I will argue that Turiel’s characterization of the moral/conventional distinction presents several conceptual and empirical problems. However, I will develop a modified version of the Turiel characterization, one which I do not think is vulnerable to the objections raised against Turiel’s original formulation and which provides a better explanation of the evidence amassed by authors working within the Turiel tradition and authors who have been critical of it. In order for the moral/conventional distinction to provide support for nativism, it must be real, and it must be such that it could not be acquired simply through general purpose learning systems and the evidence plausibly available to children. Although I do not claim to offer a fully satisfactory characterization of the distinction, I will argue that there are good reasons to believe the distinction is real, that it is highly abstract and sophisticated, and that it appears early in childhood development. For these reasons, I will conclude that the moral/conventional distinction provides the right kind of evidence with which to develop a Poverty of the Stimulus Argument for moral nativism.

3. Turiel and the Moral/Conventional Distinction

A. Children’s Social Judgments

There is now a large body of research on what is referred to as the “moral/conventional

4. I will say more in section III C about what it could mean to say that the distinction is “real.”
This work has been motivated in large part by the ideas of psychologist Elliot Turiel, who proposed that our social judgments fall into two distinct domains: the moral and the conventional. Many philosophers have argued that there is a distinction between morality and convention, but Turiel proposed that this distinction is something which all “normal” humans become sensitive to at an early age.

Although researchers have used the moral/conventional task for a variety of purposes, authors in the Turiel tradition have been particularly interested in studying two dimensions of judgment. First, they have examined what they call “criterion judgments.” Criterion judgments can be thought of as participants’ views about the status of their judgments. Turiel gives a list of some questions that have been used to elicit participants’ criterion judgments: “whether the actions would be right or wrong in the absence of a rule or law, if the act would be all right if permitted by a person in authority (e.g. a teacher in a school context), whether an act would be all right if there were general agreement as to its acceptability, and whether the act would be all right if it were accepted by another group or culture” (Turiel 2000, 905). The second dimension concerns “justifications.” To study this dimension of judgment, researchers ask participants questions about why they think a particular act is right or wrong, or okay or not okay. For instance, do they think an act is wrong because it causes someone harm, or because, say, it disrupts the social order?

In some surveys, children were asked to consider a situation in which their teacher tells them that they no longer need to raise their hands before talking in class. When asked if it would be okay to talk without raising their hands in such a scenario, almost all children said yes. But when told to imagine their teachers saying that it would be okay for them to hit their fellow schoolmates if they wanted to, children almost unanimously said that hitting would still not be okay. These studies have also presented questions such as, “Is it okay for children in other countries to hit their classmates?” Again, most participants answer that hitting is not okay. In one study, Nucci and Turiel asked Amish children to imagine a world in which God had made no rule against working on Sunday. Nearly all of the children said that, in such a situation, working on Sunday would be okay. However, when asked to consider a new scenario in which God did not forbid hitting

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5. For an overview of this research, see Charles Helwig, Marie Tisak, and Elliot Turiel (1990).

6. I am unsure whether “social” is the right word to use, but Turiel seems to use it in order to make it clear that the moral/conventional distinction does not apply to certain other kinds of judgments (e.g., epistemic judgments or judgments about matters of “personal choice”). Judgments are social if they are about how we are to relate to other human beings.
others, 80 percent of the children said that hitting would still be wrong (Nucci and Turiel 1993).

These studies have now been performed on a wide range of participants, varying in age (toddlers to adults) as well as cultural and religious backgrounds. Even neurologically atypical participants, such as autistic individuals, have been given the moral/conventional task. Interestingly, the results have been much the same for all of these groups. Participants’ judgments seem to fall into two basic patterns, though as will soon become clear, articulating just what these two patterns of judgment are has proven quite difficult.

B. Domains of Judgment
Turiel has proposed that each pattern corresponds to a distinct domain, which he calls the “moral” and “conventional” domains. On this view, moral judgments are characterized as: (1) unconditionally obligatory; (2) generalizable; (3) generally regarded as more serious than conventional judgments; and, (4) relating to concepts of harm, welfare, fairness, and rights. Justifications for these judgments are given in terms of preventing harm, promoting welfare, fairness, and rights (Turiel 2000, 905). Conventional judgments, on the other hand, are thought to be: (1) contingent on authorities, rules, and existing social and cultural practices; (2) not generalizable but applicable only within the existing social arrangements to which they are connected; (3) generally regarded as less serious than moral judgments; and, (4) unrelated to concepts of harm, welfare, fairness, and rights. Justifications for conventional judgments are not given in terms of preventing harm or promoting welfare, fairness, and rights but rather are based on “understandings of social organization, including the role of authority, custom, and social coordination” (905). On Turiel’s view, these features of moral and conventional judgments are pan-cultural.

To avoid caricaturing this view of the moral/conventional distinction, I should note that Turiel has been clear that he thinks conventional judgments can be regarded as very serious. He writes in “The Development of Morality” that convention “is not simply those residual regulations, to which there is little emotional intensity attached. They are uniformities and regularities of importance for social coordination” (905). But even the most important and deeply held conventions are still judged, on Turiel’s view, by the criteria and justifications of the conventional domain. Moreover, Turiel has maintained that his research shows that participants generally exhibit stronger emotional responses to moral violations than to conventional violations.

7. One exception would be psychopaths, who seem to regard moral judgments in the way that most individuals regard conventional judgments. See Blair (1995).
C. Models of the Cognitive Architecture Underlying Judgments

If it is indeed the case that the moral/conventional distinction emerges early in the normal course of development for all children in every culture, what conclusions, if any, can we draw about the cognitive architecture underpinning these judgments? In this section, I will present one model designed to answer this question and another model which denies that the moral/conventional distinction is, in fact, a real distinction. I will briefly discuss their relevance to the nativism debate; and, in section V, I will consider the plausibility of each model.

Turiel and his followers have not been terribly clear on what their characterization of the moral/conventional distinction is supposed to tell us about the cognitive structures involved in moral judgments. However, these researchers have been clear on the point that the moral/conventional distinction is a distinction between two conceptual domains. For example, Nucci writes that morality and convention “are both part of the social order. Conceptually, however, they are not reducible to one another and are understood within distinct conceptual frameworks or domains” (Nucci 2001, 7). Furthermore, the differences between the two conceptual domains are thought to provide part of an explanation for participants’ criterion judgments on the moral/conventional task.

In their critique of the moral/conventional distinction, Kelly and Stitch (2008) offer one model, referred to as the Moral/Conventional (M/C) model, designed to reflect these claims about the moral and conventional domains. On this model, each domain stores sets of rules,8 as well as information about those rules. For example, rules stored in the moral domain will be authority independent9 and generalizable, and justified on the basis of harm, welfare, fairness, and rights. Additionally, given Turiel’s claim that all judgments in the moral domain pertain to harm, welfare, fairness, and rights, only rules relating to these issues will be contained in the moral domain. The conventional domain, on the other hand, will contain information indicating that the rules are contingent on authority, not generalizable, etc., and that these rules pertain to matters of social coordination.

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8. Presumably, Kelly and Stitch claim that rules are stored in each domain in order to explain why moral and conventional judgments exhibit regularities. However, the fact that certain regularities can be explained by a rule does not show that there are in fact rules inside the cognitive system producing the regularities. Another possibility is that the regularities are the result of the structure of the system.

9. Kelly and Stitch replace “unconditionally obligatory” with “authority independence.” Later in the paper, I will argue that the differences between these two terms are not terribly significant, though I will give some reasons for preferring the former term.
The authors argue that the only way to make sense of the idea that the two domains play a role in explaining the patterns of participants’ responses on the moral/conventional task is to say that each domain is a functionally distinct component of the mind (357). In other words, Kelly and Stitch believe that if the distinction is to play an explanatory role, it must be more than just conceptually real but also psychologically real, i.e., it must be a distinction that reflects a division in cognitive structures. To be clear, this means that moral judgments and conventional judgments are the result of different psychological processes, organized and structured in different ways to respond to different kinds of inputs to produce different kinds of outputs. The distinction comes about, on this view, simply because conventional violations trigger the conventional judgment system, and moral violations trigger the moral judgment system.

The claim that the distinction must be psychological in order to explain participants’ behavior is, I think, vulnerable to serious objections. A conceptual distinction does not require psychologically separate structures or processes to play a role in explaining behavior. The same psychological processes and organization can result in different judgments. For example, our visual systems are not likely divided into systems that respond to tables and different systems that respond to chairs. Rather, using the same system, we are able to make conceptually distinct judgments that the things we sit in are chairs and the things we sit at are tables. So, it seems to me that the moral/conventional distinction need only be conceptually real in order to explain participants’ responses on the moral/conventional task.

Perhaps Kelly and Stitch think that if, as Turiel and his followers have claimed, the moral/conventional distinction appears cross culturally and early in development, it is more likely that the distinction is psychological. However, I do not see why the same psychological process, or organized set of psychological processes, could not be structured in such a way to reliably produce a conceptual distinction early in childhood development. If Chomsky and his followers are correct, many of the grammatical rules which children employ early in the course of normal development are specifiable in terms of abstract rules, and according to these theorists, the rules are the product of a set of psychological process dedicated to the linguistic domain. It seems then that even if the moral/conventional distinction appears in all cultures quite early in development, this fact does not provide any reason for preferring an explanation which posits a psychological distinction over one which posits only a conceptual distinction. This is not, of course, to say that we should prefer the view that the domains are only conceptually distinct, but only that Kelly and Stitch have offered no reason for thinking the domains are psychologically distinct. For the remainder of this paper, I will withhold judgment on
this issue, though I will consider the significance of each position for the nativism debate.

The alternative model proposed by Kelly and Stitch, and the one the authors actually endorse, is referred to as the Sripada and Stitch (S&S) model. Instead of two cognitive mechanisms, one for each domain, their model posits an “Acquisition Mechanism” and an “Execution Mechanism.” These mechanisms are thought to play an important role in the acquisition and implementation of “norms,” which the authors define as “a theoretically important class of behavior-regulating social rules” (Kelly and Stitch 2008, 349). The authors claim that norms specify which behaviors are required or forbidden independently of any legal or social institution, that violations of norms result in a variety of punitive attitudes including anger and blame, that norms are present in every society, that they develop in all normal children between the ages of three and five, that the norms children ultimately “internalize” are the norms of their respective cultures, and that there is substantial diversity in the norms different cultures adopt.

In the S&S model, the Acquisition Mechanism somehow locates and internalizes the prevailing norms in the child’s social environment. Once norms are acquired, the Execution Mechanism produces intrinsic motivation to comply with the norms and to punish violators (350). These features of the model are intended to explain the putative fact that norms are authority independent. Since participants are intrinsically motivated to comply with norms and to punish violators, norms do not need to be supported by authority in order for participants to feel bound by them, though Kelly and Stitch recognize that norms are often backed by authorities.

It is important not to view the S&S model as merely another way of characterizing the moral/conventional distinction because for Kelly and Stitch, there is no such distinction. The norm acquisition and execution mechanisms should not be understood as analogs to the moral domain and likewise, the cognitive structures that store all other kinds of rules should not be seen as corresponding to the conventional domain. The relevant distinction on this model is between rules with which humans are intrinsically motivated to comply (norms), and rules with which we are not. Although describing norms as “authority independent” might lead us to think of norms as similar to moral judgments, Kelly and Stitch are clear that norms need not be regarded as generalizable to other times and places, nor will they necessarily pertain to harm, welfare, fairness or rights. A person’s norms will pertain to whichever norms are adopted by the culture in which he or she is raised, and Kelly and Stitch think that cultures can and do adopt norms to regulate a wide range of behaviors. It also appears that Kelly and Stitch may not think that norm violations will

10. For the original development of this model, see Sripada and Stitch (2006).
consistently be regarded as more serious than non-norm rule violations, since they write that some non-norm rules “might evoke an authority independent response” and also claim in the next sentence that non-norm rules “may evoke any pattern of answers on the seriousness…questions” (359).

Both the M/C model and the S&S model posit domain-specific cognitive structures and therefore reject the empiricist view that moral judgments are entirely the products of general purpose learning mechanisms. On the S&S model, though, the distinction between the moral and conventional domains does not exist, psychologically or conceptually, ruling out the possibility of that distinction providing evidence on which to ground a PoS argument. However, the bare claim that the moral/conventional distinction is a distinction between two conceptual domains is neutral with respect to the nativism debate. As stated earlier, one can accept that participants in the moral/conventional task rely on a conceptual distinction in making their judgments without also accepting that the distinction is psychologically real.

If the distinction is conceptual, but not psychological, we then need to ask why moral and conventional judgments get put in different conceptual domains. One explanation could be that the two domains develop through the workings of a single cognitive structure or set of structures dedicated to producing these kinds of judgments. An empiricist explanation worth considering is that these two conceptual domains are the product of general purpose learning systems.\(^\text{11}\)

These considerations are important for the nativism debate because they help us see that the strength of the moral/conventional distinction as a line of evidence for nativism does not rest on its reflecting a psychological reality. In fact, the issue of whether it is psychological or just conceptual is an issue that should be decided after the nativist question is answered. If we find that the early emergence of the distinction is best explained by positing some kind of innate, domain specific structure(s), we then need to ask whether the distinction reflects a division in cognitive structures designed for different tasks, or a single structure designed, at least in part, to enable children to develop a conceptual distinction between the moral and conventional domains.

4. Problems with the Moral/Conventional Distinction

A. Conceptual Problems

Before we get into empirical data, there are conceptual problems with the moral/

\(^{11}\) I will have more to say about the prospects of an empiricist explanation in Section VI.
conventional distinction that deserve attention. First, although this point is not necessarily a criticism, it should be noted that the terms “unconditionally obligatory” and “generalizable” are not neutral terms in ethical theory. They are the product of a Kantian tradition and are absent from, for instance, virtue theories of ethics.

Furthermore, it is not easy to spell out just what these terms mean. The first, “unconditionally obligatory,” involves two rather complicated concepts. The term “obligation” is a theoretical notion in that it is the product of theories constructed to provide accounts of right action (e.g., Kantianism or Utilitarianism). While most people are probably familiar with words such as “obligatory,” “permissible,” and “impermissible,” it is unclear whether these words are ordinarily understood to mean anything more than just “okay” and “not okay.”

It is unclear from Turiel’s writings whether he takes “obligatory” to simply mean okay or something stronger. However, the main idea he seems to be trying to convey in describing moral judgments as “unconditionally obligatory” is that they apply under all circumstances. So, on this formulation, the judgment that, say, lying is morally wrong would mean that it is not okay to lie under any circumstances. This idea is potentially problematic. Although we may judge that lying is wrong, it is not hard to think of conditions in which lying seems okay. It might be okay to lie to save someone’s life or even just to save someone from embarrassment. For example, if a friend asks me if his or her new pair of pants makes him or her look fat, there does not seem to be anything wrong with me answering “no,” even if I really believe the pants do make him or her look fat. Context seems important in determining the applicability of moral judgments.

I believe we can understand “unconditional” in a way that allows for moral judgments to be sensitive to context. We could, for instance, say that though people might make judgments such as “lying is wrong,” certain implicit assumptions are built into these judgments. For example, one assumption might be that it is not wrong to lie if there are more compelling moral reasons to lie. If that is right, then one could say that under no conditions is it okay to lie if there are not at least equally strong moral reasons for lying. This kind of judgment can plausibly be thought of as unconditionally obligatory, but it is clear that context does matter for the applicability of such a judgment. So the idea that moral judgments are unconditionally obligatory, plausibly understood, allows for judgments to be context-sensitive.

The idea that moral judgments are generalizable also presents conceptual challenges. If this claim is to have any plausibility, it should not be taken to mean that judgments

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12. This point is borrowed from Dwyer, unpublished manuscript.
generalize to *all* situations. For instance, it seems odd to say the judgment that it is wrong to steal generalizes to a situation in which a poor man steals a loaf of bread because it is the only way he can feed his starving family. However, judgments about the wrongness of stealing do seem appropriate in a situation in which a wealthy man steals a loaf of bread just to see if he can get away with it.

A way of explaining these intuitions is to say that moral judgments generalize only to cases similar in all *morally relevant* respects. To see if a judgment made in one context applies in another, we have to consider whether the two contexts are similar in ways that are morally relevant before determining whether the judgment can be applied in the latter case. For example, in the case of the two bread thieves, the wealthy man’s action is judged as wrong, while the poor man’s action is not, because their reasons for stealing the bread were different, and this difference is morally relevant to an assessment of the wrongness of the act. I do not think there is anything particularly controversial about this notion of generalizability, but it will become important later on in the paper when I consider some objections to the moral/conventional distinction.

I think one broader reason for why it is difficult to articulate just what is meant when terms such as “unconditionally obligatory” and “generalizable” are used to describe moral judgments is that it is far from clear what exactly moral judgments apply to. Some theorists maintain that moral judgments are fundamentally about *rules*. There are many variations of this view, but they generally hold that we have rules that specify which classes of actions are okay and which are not. To judge a particular action as “not okay” is to judge that the action falls within a more general class of actions that are prohibited by a given rule. Other theorists maintain that moral judgments are most fundamentally about *particular* actions, character qualities, states of affairs, etc. They may still think it is helpful to formulate rules as a way of systematizing our particular judgments, but the particular judgments are more fundamental. The rule-based account might seem more plausible given the regularities that we observe in moral judgments. However, as I discussed earlier, even if one accepts a rule-based account, one must still allow judgments to have some degree of context-sensitivity in order to capture ordinary intuitions. This requirement can be met by claiming either that exceptions are built into the rules (e.g., it is wrong to lie *unless* there are more morally compelling reasons to lie) or that our moral rules form some sort of hierarchy such that higher-level rules sometimes requires us to break lower-level rules. I will not try to settle whether moral judgments are fundamentally about particulars or about rules in this paper, but the issue will have some relevance to the discussion in section V.

A final challenge for Turiel’s view, one which I think is a more serious problem, is that
it seems unduly restrictive to claim that moral judgments relate only to harm, welfare, fairness, and rights, and that justifications of moral judgments are only given in terms of these concepts. It is true that on the moral/conventional task, the only judgments that have been found consistently to exhibit the moral response pattern have related to these issues, but these studies presented participants with a limited range of moral issues. Much more evidence would be needed to infer that all moral judgments do, in fact, relate only to welfare, harm, fairness, and rights. As I will explain below, studies that have examined participants’ responses to a wider range of issues have found that moral judgments are often about things having nothing to do with any of these concepts.

B. Empirical Problems

There are now many studies that have yielded results that seem to undermine various elements of Turiel’s characterization of the moral/conventional distinction. One early study by Haidt, Koller, and Dias (1993) found that participants in low socio-economic groups in both the United States and Brazil judged certain acts, such as masturbating into a chicken carcass and cleaning one’s toilet bowl with the national flag, to be seriously wrong. They also judged that these actions would be wrong even if they were performed in other times and places or in cultures where such practices were supported by authority. This result is important because neither act seems to involve harm, welfare, fairness, or rights, yet they are judged by criteria that, on Turiel’s view, belong exclusively to the moral domain. It is also important because participants in higher socioeconomic groups were far less likely to judge these acts as moral issues. This result challenges Turiel’s claim that across the human species, only certain kinds of acts are judged by moral criteria. It suggests rather that socioeconomic status can have a significant impact on the kinds of acts that are regarded as warranting moral or conventional judgments.

The philosopher Shaun Nichols has also conducted studies in which participants judged violations of certain etiquette rules by moral criteria. In one study of college students (Nichols 2002), Nichols found that many of the students regarded the act of spitting in one’s cup before drinking as more seriously wrong than drinking tomato soup straight out of the bowl at a party. Many also said that the former action would still not be okay even if it was approved by custom or authority. Furthermore, over 60% of participants said the reason spitting in one’s cup before drinking is wrong is that it is gross. Here, again, participants’ criterion judgments would suggest that they judge the action to be morally wrong, but the act in question does not involve welfare, harm, fairness, or rights, and participants did not appeal to these concepts in their justifications.

Most of the studies that challenge Turiel’s characterization of the moral/conventional
distinction suggest that actions that do not involve harm, welfare, fairness, or rights are often judged by criteria thought to belong exclusively to the moral domain. If these studies tell us anything, it is that a broader range of actions can evoke the moral response than Turiel and many of his followers have assumed. The studies do not provide any reason to think there is no distinction. In fact, to say that a broader range of actions can evoke the moral response presupposes a distinction between morality and conventions. Moreover, these studies do not challenge the claim that issues relating to harm, welfare, fairness and rights consistently evoke the moral response.

Nevertheless, some researchers have questioned whether the distinction is even conceptually real. Although few studies have directly investigated this claim, Kelly et al. (2007a) produced results which the authors argue provide preliminary grounds for skepticism about the moral/conventional distinction.13

Kelly et al. investigated whether rules pertaining to harm are always judged by the criteria of the moral domain. Two things deserve mentioning before I describe their survey and the conclusions the authors draw from it. First, Kelly et al. characterize the moral/conventional distinction as a distinction between rules, and not fundamentally as a distinction between judgments. Second, the authors’ list of moral domain criteria differs in one respect from the list I have been using. Whereas I have taken the Turiel characterization to be committed to the claim that moral judgments are regarded as unconditionally obligatory, Kelly et al. describe moral judgments as being “authority independent” on the Turiel view. Although I will argue that these points are not terribly significant in evaluating Kelly et al.’s conclusions, it is worth noting these distinctive features of the authors’ account of the moral domain. Now, let me describe their survey and the conclusions the authors’ draw from the results.

Kelly et al. created an online survey designed to elicit participants’ reactions to a number of scenarios involving one character or set of characters harming others. In

13. To be clear, Kelly et al. state that they are only challenging the claim that the moral/conventional distinction reflects a psychological distinction. For example, they seem to take Turiel and his followers to be claiming that the moral/conventional distinction is psychologically real (117), and in their conclusion, they write that their results suggest that “the moral/conventional task is not a good assay for the existence of a psychologically important distinction” (130). However, their position on this matter seems to reflect the claim made in Kelly and Stitch (2008) that only a psychological distinction could explain how participants consistently exhibit behavior which allegedly involves patterns associated with either the moral or conventional domain. If I am right in thinking that such behavior may only reflect a conceptual distinction, then Kelly et al. are effectively challenging the idea that the moral/conventional distinction reflects a genuine conceptual distinction since they hold that the behavior of participants does not, in fact, exhibit either the moral or conventional responses.
discussing their motivations for conducting the study, the authors argue for a need to study individuals’ reactions to a broader range of moral violations than the ones presented in research on the moral/conventional task. They note that in those studies, the moral violations tend to be of the “schoolyard” variety (e.g., one child hitting another child). In their online survey, they asked participants about scenarios that involved other kinds of harms, varying the time and location of the harms to test whether moral rules (specifically harm rules) are generalizable, and varying whether or not the transgression had been sanctioned by an authority in order to see if moral rules are authority independent.

In each scenario, participants were asked whether it was okay for the character in the hypothetical scenario to engage in the act described, and then asked to rate the character’s action on a scale from 0 to 9, with 0 being “not bad at all” and 9 being “very bad.”

The first scenario set, referred to as Whipping/Temporal, was designed to see if moral rules relating to harm generalize. It goes as follows:

Scenario 1
Three hundred years ago, whipping was a common practice in most navies and on cargo ships. There were no laws against it, and almost everyone thought that whipping was an appropriate way to discipline sailors who disobeyed orders or were drunk on duty. Mr. Williams was an officer on a cargo ship 300 years ago. One night, while at sea, he found a sailor drunk at a time when the sailor should have been on watch. After the sailor sobered up, Williams punished the sailor by giving him 5 lashes with a whip.

Scenario 2
Mr. Adams is an officer on a large modern American cargo ship in 2004. One night, while at sea, he finds a sailor drunk at a time when the sailor should have been monitoring the radar screen. After the sailor sobers up, Adams punishes the sailor by giving him 5 lashes with a whip. (123)

A second version of this scenario set, Whipping/Authority, was presented to participants to test whether the sanctioning of whipping by an authority figure affected participants’ judgments about whether whipping is okay. This version involves Mr. Adams (the officer on the modern American ship) again, and again in one of the scenarios he gives a drunken sailor five lashes. However, in the second scenario, Mr. Adams is told by
the captain of the cargo ship that “on this ship it is OK for officers to whip sailors.” 14

In total, Kelly et al. presented participants with eight different sets of “harm” scenarios. 15 Two of the sets were designed to test whether judgments about harm transgressions generalize to other times and places. These included Whipping/Temporal and Slavery/Spatio-temporal, which asked participants whether it was okay for ancient Greeks and Romans to own slaves and whether it was okay for people in the American South to own slaves 200 years ago. Six of the sets were designed to investigate whether harm norms are judged to be authority independent. These included Whipping/Authority, Military training/Authority, Prisoner abuse/Authority, Spanking/Authority, Hair pull/Authority, and Hitting/Authority. All of these scenarios involved a character inflicting some sort of harm on another character, and each included a version in which the harmful activity is endorsed by an authority figure and a scenario in which the authority figure has either said nothing regarding the harmful activity or said specifically that it is not okay in the particular context.

Results showed that participants were, in most cases, much more likely to judge characters’ behaviors as okay and to give them a low ranking on the “how bad” scale in the versions of the scenarios in which either the behavior took place in a different time and social context or some authority figure had sanctioned the behavior. For instance, in Whipping/Temporal, 51 percent of participants said it was okay for Mr. Williams (the officer on the cargo ship 300 years ago) to whip one of his sailors as punishment for drunkenness, whereas only ten percent said it was okay for Mr. Adams (the officer on the modern American cargo ship) to whip a sailor for the same reason. In Spanking/Authority, there was also a significant difference in participants’ answers. 44 percent of participants said that it was okay for the teacher to spank her student when spanking was not against the law and she had the principal’s permission, but only five percent said that spanking was okay in the scenario where the teacher did not have permission and there was a law against spanking. Only in Slavery/Spatio-temporal was the difference not so stark. Seven percent of participants reported that slavery was okay 200 years ago in the American South (a surprisingly high number), and just 11 percent of participants said that slavery was okay in Greco-Roman times (126).

14. For all of the scenarios and results, Kelly et al. (2007b).

15. They also presented a ninth scenario designed to test Nichols’ hypothesis that transgressions of rules which evoke negative affect are more likely to evoke the moral response pattern. Since it is not my intention to consider the viability of Nichols’ hypothesis in this paper, I have excluded the results of that scenario from this discussion.
Kelly et al. admit that more research is needed before we can reach any definitive conclusions about the viability of Turiel’s moral/conventional distinction as a hypothesis, but they do think that, along with other studies mentioned earlier regarding participants’ judgments about issues unrelated to harm, welfare, fairness, or rights, there is good evidence for completely rejecting Turiel’s characterization of the moral/conventional distinction, and even for rejecting the claim that the distinction is conceptually real altogether (130). Kelly et al. argue that if humans really do recognize a moral/conventional distinction that is anything like Turiel’s characterization, we would expect participants in the authors’ survey to judge harmful acts such as whipping and spanking as either okay in each scenario or not okay in each scenario. We should expect this result, they think, because acts involving harm clearly pertain to the moral domain (assuming for the sake of argument that there really is such a domain), so judgments about these acts should be regarded by participants as authority independent and generalizable. Since their findings suggest that people’s judgments about the same harmful act (e.g., whipping) are often different in different contexts, they conclude that it is unlikely that the moral/conventional distinction reflects a real psychological or conceptual distinction. They suggest that further studies should reexamine the previous research on schoolyard transgressions to see why participants reported that these kinds of harm norms apply generally and hold independently of authority.

5. Whither Moral/Conventional Distinction?
I agree with Kelly et al. that there are problems, both conceptually and empirically, with some of the ways in which the Turiel tradition has characterized the moral/conventional distinction. However, I do not think the evidence put forth to challenge the moral/conventional distinction as it has been characterized gives any reason to think that the distinction is not even conceptually real, nor do I think that the evidence is sufficient for a wholesale rejection of Turiel’s characterization. In this section, I will explain why I think criticisms of the moral/conventional distinction fall short and suggest some ways in which the Turiel characterization can be improved.

A. Getting Straight What is Being Distinguished
It seems to me that one of the biggest challenges facing both supporters and critics of Turiel’s view is that it is not clear what exactly is being distinguished. This is hardly surprising, given the subject. It seems that any attempt to define morality or conventions is sure to raise further questions. I do not propose to even attempt to give a full analysis of either concept here, but these difficulties are worth raising because I suspect they have
much to do with the confusion. Turiel’s writings are not always easy to interpret, but he seems to think that the moral/conventional distinction is a distinction between moral and conventional judgments. However, the distinction is often described in the literature as a distinction between two kinds of rules.

As I mentioned earlier, the M/C model which Kelly and Stitch develop and criticize offers a rule-based account; that is, to make a judgment about a particular act is to say that the act either complies with or transgresses a given rule. This view does imply a distinction between moral and conventional judgments, but it is more of a derivative distinction. A judgment is moral if it is a judgment about whether or not an act complies with a rule stored in the moral domain, and it is a conventional judgment if it is about whether an act complies with a rule stored in the conventional domain (Kelly and Stitch 2008, 357).

This articulation of the M/C model is reflected in Kelly et al. (2007a), in which the authors frequently talk about moral and conventional norms and rules. I think there are problems with the idea that judging that \( x \) is wrong means judging that \( x \) transgresses some rule. The idea has some appeal, since moral judgments do follow certain obvious regularities. For instance, if someone regularly judges instances of promise-breaking to be wrong, one way to explain this regularity is to say that the person is employing a rule that says something like “persons ought to keep their promises.” However, even if judgments are just the applications of rules, it seems implausible to think that many people have rules such as “persons ought to keep their promises” stored in their minds/brains because rules such as this one are often ignored or transgressed. More importantly, in some situations we might judge that it is okay, or even obligatory, to break a promise. For instance, if a person promises his friend that he will return the friend’s rifle to him in a week, it seems wrong for the person to return the rifle a week later if he finds the friend in a drunken rage.

Someone could respond that we do have rules such as “persons ought to keep their promises” that we make use of in our moral judgments, but that we also have other rules about, say, not needlessly putting others’ lives in danger, and that, furthermore, these rules can and do conflict with one another. In these cases, we may have higher-order rules that guide us in deciding which lower-order rules to break. It may also be that though we make judgments such as “persons ought to keep their promises,” these rules have exceptions built into them (e.g., persons ought to keep their promises unless there are more morally compelling reasons to break them). There may be some truth to one or even both of these accounts, but it seems clear that if one is going to take the position that moral judgments are just the applications of rules to particular actions, situations,
etc., one is going to have to allow that the rules we use in our judgments are fairly sophisticated and may involve higher-order rules.

Second, I want to suggest from this discussion that, while the rule-based account of judgments is appealing because it gives a somewhat clear view of what judgments are, it is not obvious that our judgments (particularly our moral judgments) exhibit enough regularity to infer that they are just the applications of rules. Whatever clarity the rule-based account offers, it is somewhat lost once we try to account for the fact that almost all moral rules are sometimes suspended.

Finally, even if our moral judgments exhibit enough regularity to be specifiable in terms of rules (e.g., persons ought to keep their promises), that by itself does not tell us that the regularities are actually governed by rules in our cognitive structures, as both the M/C model and the S&S model suppose. To say that there are rules in our cognitive structures is to say that these structures literally contain nonconscious rules. However, it may be rather that the rules are in the structure of the cognitive systems, i.e., the arrangement of psychological processes produces a set of information transformation that is specifiable in terms of rules, but the system does not contain any such rules. To see the difference, it is helpful to think of the motherboard of a computer. The motherboard is arranged so that certain information transformations occur in a very specific way—a way that is specifiable in terms of rules. However, it is not the case that the motherboard contains such rules—what it is is a certain structure and arrangement for information transformation.

B. Why the Data does not Really Pose a Problem for the Distinction

As stated earlier, Kelly et al. argue that the results of their survey strongly suggest that a particular subset of moral rules, those relating to harm, do not consistently evoke the moral response pattern as Turiel and his followers have characterized it. That is, these rules are not consistently regarded as generalizable or authority independent. I believe the authors’ conclusion is incorrect, but to see just where their analysis goes wrong, we will need to examine more carefully the scenario sets designed to test the generalizable hypothesis and the authority independent hypothesis.

One methodological problem with Kelly et al.’s study is that the survey does not make it clear in the instructions what is meant by “OK.” If participants took “OK” to simply mean “OK relative to the standards of the time and place in which the action was performed,” then it would make sense that many participants judged the actions by conventional domain criteria and the study’s results would not pose any problem
for the moral/conventional distinction. The descriptions of all eight scenarios provide information regarding whether the acts are considered okay relative to the specific conventions in place. For example, in Hair pull/Authority, the teacher says “at this school there is no rule against pulling hair. Anybody can pull someone’s hair if they want to.” The other descriptions contain similar phrases. This information might have led some participants to think that the questions were simply asking whether the acts were okay relative to the conventions of the contexts in which they occurred. If a significant number of participants interpreted the questions in this way, the fact that participants were more likely to judge acts as not okay when there were authorities forbidding them provides no evidence that harm violations do not evoke the moral response.

This explanation is particularly helpful, I think, in making sense of the results of Hair pull/Authority and Hitting/Authority. These scenario sets are quite similar to the schoolyard transgressions typical of moral/conventional task studies, yet participants’ responses differed dramatically from the moral response pattern observed in those studies. Hair pull/Authority involved one eight-year-old girl pulling another eight-year-old girl’s hair on the playground. Four percent of participants said it was okay without the teacher’s permission, but 14 percent responded that pulling hair was okay when the teacher said it was okay and there was no school rule against it. Hitting/Authority involved one grade school boy hitting another. 14 percent said it was okay without the teacher’s permission, whereas 53 percent responded that hitting was okay with the teacher’s permission and in the absence of a school rule against it.

These scenario sets involve similar kinds of harms to the ones typically presented on moral/conventional task surveys, but Kelly et al.’s scenarios differ in that the descriptions do not make it clear how “OK” is to be understood. This omission contrasts with many of the studies conducted by Turiel and his followers, such as Nucci (1985) and Nucci and Turiel (1993). These studies examined whether Catholic, Protestant fundamentalist, and Jewish youths regard moral and conventional judgments differently, even conventional judgments that are supported by religious authorities such as the Catholic Church and/or Christian and Hebrew scriptures. In these studies, the question descriptions make it clear that participants are being asked whether religious authorities can change the status of moral judgments about typical moral issues such as harm and unfairness, not just in local contexts, but for everyone. By making the scope of the judgments clear, participants are required to consider whether the authorities really have jurisdiction over these issues. Not surprisingly, the results of these studies were in line with what the moral/conventional

16. For a similar criticism, see Rosas (2012, 6).
distinction predicts. Over 90 percent of Catholic adolescents said it would be wrong for religious authorities to suspend judgments against transgressions such as stealing and harming others, and over 80 percent of Protestant fundamentalist and Jewish adolescents said it would be wrong for religious authorities to suspend these moral judgments.

It might be asked whether distinguishing between senses of “OK” presupposes that people do in fact distinguish between moral and conventional judgments. However, one can accept that OK is sometimes regarded as having a wide scope and sometimes regarded as having a narrow scope without accepting that this difference reflects a genuine distinction between two conceptual (or perhaps psychological) domains. For example, one can believe the judgment “it is wrong to kill people just for fun” has a wide scope while the judgment “it is wrong to place one’s fork on the right side of one’s plate” has a narrow scope without any prior commitment to the moral/conventional distinction.

Even assuming most participants took OK to mean “morally OK” in the majority of Kelly et al.’s cases, the results of five of the scenario sets (Whipping/Temporal, Whipping/Authority, Military training/Authority, Prisoner abuse/Authority, and Spanking/Authority) do not seem problematic for the moral/conventional distinction if we consider some important differences between these scenarios and the ones typically presented to participants in moral/conventional task surveys. Although Kelly et al. are right to point out that these five scenarios are unique in that they do not involve schoolyard harm violations, they are also unique in that the harmful acts are not performed on innocent victims, as is typical of moral/conventional task studies (e.g., one student hitting another student just for the fun of it). In Whipping/Temporal, Whipping/Authority, and Spanking/Authority, the harmful acts are performed as punishment for wrongdoing. Additionally, in Whipping/Temporal, the description makes it clear that, in the Mr. Williams case, whipping was a common practice and “almost everyone thought whipping was an appropriate way to discipline sailors who…were drunk on duty” (Kelly et al. 2007a, 123). From this information, participants could have reasonably concluded that, unlike in the modern whipping case, the drunken sailor on Mr. Williams’ cargo ship would have known that he would be whipped as punishment for being drunk on duty when he agreed to join the crew and that, given the views of the time, he would have regarded whipping as an appropriate punishment for such behavior.

The Prisoner abuse/Authority cases involve torture, not punishment, though the victim is described as a suspected terrorist and he is tortured in order to obtain information about future terrorist attacks. The Military training/Authority cases involve individuals training to become elite American military commandos. Participants likely assumed that the individuals freely chose to enroll in the training program and they
may have assumed further that the trainees were aware of the physical abuse training would involve. Moreover, the description states that “most people in the military believe that these simulated interrogations were helpful in preparing trainees for situations they might face later in their military careers” (Kelly et al. 2007b, 5). It is clear, then, that the abuse was performed for what was perceived to be the good of the trainees.

Since none of these cases involved the harming of innocent victims and many of the descriptions provided what participants might have considered to be justifiable reasons for committing the acts, it is likely that many participants regarded these acts as morally okay, at least when they were not forbidden by authorities. Although the Turiel characterization includes “concepts of harm” within the moral domain and claims that moral judgments are often justified in terms of preventing harm, it does not claim that all instances of harm will evoke the moral response pattern, so this conclusion is entirely compatible with the moral/conventional distinction. However, we still need to explain why many participants judged the acts as not okay when they were forbidden by authorities.

If my point about generalizability is on track, the fact that an action is judged as morally okay in one context does not guarantee that it will be judged as morally okay in another context, since there may be morally relevant differences between the contexts. Acts involving harming the innocent, stealing, and other typical moral transgressions are widely regarded as wrong in other times and places, and there may be few circumstances in which participants would regard these kinds of acts as okay. However, there are plausible explanations for why participants regarded the acts Kelly et al. presented as okay in certain contexts and not okay in other contexts.

Despite Kelly et al.’s claim that in the Whipping/Temporal case, “Clearly, many subjects think that whipping was OK 300 years ago though they do not think it is OK now” (Kelly et al. 2007a, 126), there are a number of differences between the two cases which participants may have regarded as morally relevant. As I said, participants would have likely assumed from the description that the sailor who was whipped 300 years ago would have known that whipping was the standard punishment for being drunk on duty before he decided to get drunk or to even serve on the ship. In the modern case, however, it could reasonably be assumed that the man who was whipped was unaware that he would be punished in such a manner when he decided to get drunk or when he decided to join the ship’s crew.

In Whipping/Authority, Military training/Authority, Prisoner abuse/Authority, and Spanking/Authority, participants were more likely to say the acts were not okay when they were forbidden by authorities. These scenarios were designed to test whether
harm judgments are regarded as “authority independent” rather than “unconditionally obligatory.” I attempted to argue earlier that we should not take “unconditionally obligatory” to mean that moral judgments hold under all circumstances. There may be important contextual assumptions built in, or, if the rule-based account is correct, the rules may be structured in some sort of hierarchy that makes them context-sensitive. If we consider these cases carefully, I do not think the results suggest that moral judgments are not regarded as unconditionally obligatory, nor do they suggest that moral judgments are not regarded as authority independent for that matter.

One explanation for the results is that, though participants think the acts are generally okay, they believe it is morally wrong to disobey authorities in the absence of a compelling moral reason to do so. Many philosophers have held views along these lines, and regardless of the merits of this position, something like it may be held by many people outside of academic philosophy. Such a judgment, it should be noted, fits Turiel’s other criterion judgments. It can be generalized to other times and places and may, with certain contextual assumptions, apply unconditionally. Furthermore, a judgment about our obligations to authorities could also be authority independent. Some people might think that, regardless of whether authorities say so, it is morally wrong to disobey authorities unless one has a compelling justification.

Participants might have believed the harmful acts had sufficient justification to make them generally okay, but thought these considerations were insufficient to justify disobedience. The moral/conventional distinction does not, of course, include violations of authorities’ commands in the moral domain, but, as I’ve already argued, Turiel’s characterization needs to be modified somewhat to allow that some people will moralize things having nothing to do with harm, welfare, fairness, or rights.

Even if participants do not hold this view, they still might have thought that disobedience would be wrong in Kelly et al.’s cases. Perhaps they thought disobedience would undermine the authority of the individuals who issued the orders or undermine the effectiveness of the organizations that adopted the rules. For example, a school in which teachers ignore school policies and the principal’s explicit instructions might encounter serious difficulties in educating its students, and a military in which sergeants disregard orders from the Pentagon may be more likely to fail to uphold U.S. values in its efforts to defend the nation.

These points help us see that, even if we prefer to characterize moral judgments as “authority independent” rather than “unconditionally obligatory,” Kelly et al.’s results are

17. There may, of course, be contextual assumptions—e.g., the authorities/laws are reasonably just.
not problematic for the moral/conventional distinction. If my interpretation of the data is broadly correct, participants do not judge acts as morally wrong simply because there is some general consensus that they are wrong or because an authority says so. Rather, these judgments are the consequences of beliefs about one’s obligations to authorities and to the law, or beliefs about the negative consequences of disobedience. It seems unlikely, then, that participants think that for these harmful acts, whether or not they are morally okay is merely a matter of what authorities/laws say on the matter.

One additional possibility is that the moral ambiguities of the scenarios led participants to interpret “OK” in the narrow sense, in which case the results of these scenarios reflect the conventional response pattern. The scenarios’ descriptions provided enough information to make it fairly easy to determine whether the acts were okay relative to the conventions of their specific contexts, so participants may have opted for the narrow interpretation in order to avoid making difficult moral judgments.

The results of the slavery cases are more difficult to explain away. Since slavery was considered okay by the conventions of both the American South and Ancient Greece and Rome, we would not expect more participants to regard slavery as okay in the latter context if they understood “OK” in a narrow sense. Moreover, both cases involve acts of harm against innocent victims.

Nevertheless, I do not think the slavery cases provide much evidence against the moral/conventional distinction. First, 11 percent of participants regarded slavery as okay in Ancient Greece and Rome, which is only four percent more than in the American South case. Second, 83.9 percent of participants identified as living in the United States (122), and the association of Southern slavery with the United States’ history of racism and marginalization of African Americans may have influenced participants’ judgments.

Although Kelly et al.’s study does not seem to pose a problem for the moral/conventional distinction, I think we can draw two lessons from Haidt and Nichol’s work that will help us re-characterize the moral/conventional distinction in a way that gets us closer to a real distinction. First, however, it is worth emphasizing again that this work does not provide any evidence that certain issues, such as those involving the harming of an innocent victim, do not universally evoke the moral response pattern. Keeping this point in mind, the authors’ work does nevertheless provide compelling evidence that a much wider range of issues than ones relating to harm, welfare, fairness, and rights can evoke the moral response pattern. Haidt has done considerable work on trying to identify all of the areas human cultures include as part of the moral domain. For example, Haidt and Bjorklund (2008) offer five sets of what they call “moral intuitions” which they claim are pan-cultural: harm/care, fairness/reciprocity, authority/respect, purity/sanctity,
and concerns about boundaries between in-group and out-group. Haidt and Bjorklund’s view may or may not be correct; the point is that we need to broaden the range of acts, character qualities, etc. that can be included in the moral domain.

Second, we should recognize that an individual or group may moralize something that is not moralized by another individual or group. To give an example from Haidt, Koller, and Dias’ work, low socioeconomic groups in Brazil and the U.S. may view the act of masturbating with a chicken carcass as an act that warrants a moral judgment, while high socioeconomic groups in Brazil and the U.S. may see such an act as wrong only from a conventional standpoint. It may very well be that, on the final analysis, we cannot give a comprehensive list of the kinds of things that can and cannot be included in the moral domain. Accepting this point does not undermine the moral/conventional distinction. In fact, to say that one individual views judgments about a particular act as moral judgments, while another views them as conventional judgments, is to accept that there is a distinction, at least conceptually.

C. Problems with the S&S Model

In order to adequately evaluate the plausibility of the moral/conventional distinction, we need to compare its strengths and weaknesses with the strengths and weaknesses of competing views. The S&S model is the only psychological model I am aware of that does not treat the moral/conventional distinction as real, so I will use it as the comparison model.18

One of the motivations behind the S&S model is that it is supposed to do a better job explaining why such a wide range of judgments exhibit something like Turiel’s characterization of the moral response. On the S&S model, any norm prevailing in a given community can be internalized through the Acquisition Device. For this reason, Kelly and Stitch think the S&S model can explain why, for example, many people in low socioeconomic groups in the U.S. and Brazil judged washing the toilet bowl with the national flag to be wrong independent of what authorities say while people in high socioeconomic groups generally did not. However, this feature of the model does not seem to give it an advantage over the moral/conventional distinction because, as I argued, we can modify Turiel’s characterization to allow for a divergence of judgments in borderline cases.

The other important component of the model, the Execution Device, ensures that

18. Since I have already discussed some of the problems with rule-based accounts of moral judgments, I set those problems for the S&S model (and the M/C model) aside here.
individuals will be intrinsically motivated to comply with norms and to punish violators. Kelly and Stitch emphasize that the intrinsic motivation attached to norms is what distinguishes them as a special class of social rules. They write that the intrinsic motivation to comply with norms and to punish violators “sharply distinguishes norms from other rules or information that may be mentally represented elsewhere in an agent’s cognitive system” (Kelly and Stitch 2008, 350).

However, the model says little about non-norm rules and, at times, the authors seem to suggest that the distinction between norms and other rules is not so sharp. In fact, Kelly and Stitch suggest that rules outside of the norm database may exhibit many of the same features as rules in the database. The authors even write that non-norm rules “may evoke an authority independent response” (359). This concession seems to leave the model with little predictive power. If it is not at all clear on the S&S model what distinguishes norms from other rules, it is difficult to see how we might use it to make predictions about participants’ judgments on moral/conventional task surveys.

Supporters of the S&S model would likely respond that, at the very least, the S&S model predicts that studies will not reveal a strong tendency for actions which are viewed as authority independent to also be viewed as generalizable,19 nor will there be a great deal of uniformity in which kinds of actions are regarded as authority independent in different cultures. However, the evidence suggests neither claim is correct. Paradigm moral transgressions (e.g., hitting someone just for the fun of it) are consistently regarded by participants of different ages and cultural and religious backgrounds as wrong in other times and places and as unconditionally obligatory. Paradigm conventional transgressions (e.g., talking without raising one’s hand in class) are consistently regarded as neither generalizable nor authority independent (or unconditionally obligatory). Such consistency is inconsistent with the S&S model. Even though the consistency breaks down somewhat in borderline cases, other transgressions that are sometimes regarded as both authority independent (or unconditionally obligatory) are also typically regarded as generalizable. Kelly et al. mention only one study, Nichols (2002), in which violations of certain etiquette norms were regarded by American college students as authority independent but not generalizable. But the most we can conclude from this result is that people do not always get the distinction right in borderline cases.

It seems then that the most serious problem with the S&S model is that it denies

19. Kelly and Stitch are clear that while norms are regarded on the S&S model as authority independent since participants allegedly have intrinsic motivation to comply with them, norms are not necessarily regarded as generalizable, even beyond one’s immediate social context (359).
even the conceptual reality of a distinction which participants in moral/conventional task surveys reliably make in paradigm cases. That is not to say, though, that the M/C model Kelly and Stitch offer fully captures the distinction. As I have said, I do not think the fact that the distinction helps explain participants’ behavior is evidence that it reflects a psychological distinction. Moreover, I think the M/C model wrongly assumes that simply because we can characterize moral and conventional judgments as the applications of rules means that our cognitive structures literally contain propositional rules. There is also a good deal of evidence to suggest that, contrary to the M/C model, violations having nothing to do with harm, welfare, fairness or rights can be regarded as generalizable and unconditionally obligatory (or authority independent). Given these concerns with the M/C model and the concerns I raised earlier with the Turiel characterization, I will now try to sketch more of a positive account of how I think the moral/conventional distinction breaks down, one which I believe largely preserves the spirit of Turiel’s characterization.

D. Why the Moral/Conventional Distinction is an Important Conceptual Distinction

If my criticisms of the Turiel characterization and the M/C model are on track, a good place to start in articulating a positive account of the moral/conventional distinction is to address why characterizing the distinction has proven so difficult. This problem could be seen as evidence that the distinction is rather abstract and sophisticated, or that it is vague and confused. I actually think both explanations are correct to an extent.

I have said that there is a considerable degree of consistency in participants’ judgments (including children’s) in “paradigm” moral and conventional cases, though much more variability in “borderline” cases. The paradigm moral cases, it seems, have to do with issues such as harming innocent victims, welfare, fairness, and rights. Paradigm conventional cases, according to Turiel, are based on “understandings of social organization, including the role of authority, custom, and social coordination.” This description may not be as clear as one would like, but issues such as whether it is appropriate to speak in class without raising one’s hand and whether church should be held on Sunday or Saturday seem to fit this category and there is ample evidence that these issues do consistently evoke the conventional response.

We have already examined a number of cases which may be called borderline cases since participants often differ on whether they regard them as moral or conventional issues. These include issues relating to disgust (e.g., masturbating with a chicken carcass, violations of etiquette norms), in-group out-group relations (washing one’s toilet bowl

20. Indeed, as I have explained, even characterizing our judgments as the applications of rules is no simple task.
with one’s national flag seems to belong in this category), perhaps certain harmful acts if the victims are not innocent and/or there are possible justifications for the acts, and perhaps even issues related to paradigm moral cases (e.g. Kelly et al.’s Hair pull/Authority and Hitting/Authority) if the questions are worded in a way that suggests to participants that they are being asked whether the acts comply with the conventions of the specific context.

The divergence of responses in these borderline cases suggests, I think, that the moral/conventional distinction may be somewhat vague. However, the near uniformity with which it is applied in paradigm cases suggests that it is not a hopelessly confused concept and, moreover, that it is an important conceptual distinction and an important line of evidence in the nativism debate. Regardless of how consistently the distinction is applied in borderline cases, the consistency of its application in paradigm cases, even among young children from a range of backgrounds, is something that requires an explanation. The extent to which empiricist and nativist accounts are successful on this front is significant in evaluating the debate between moral nativists and empiricists.

To say the distinction is applied consistently in paradigm cases requires a sufficiently clear characterization of the distinction so that we can determine whether it is in fact applied consistently. We have found that, for instance, the judgment that it is not okay to hit other students just for the fun of it is thought by most people to apply in other times and places, even hypothetical situations in which the teacher has said hitting is okay. The judgment that it is wrong to talk without raising one’s hand does not apply if the teacher says so, nor does it apply in cultures with different customs regarding talking in class. It is, of course, difficult to say just what these differences are telling us about how the two judgments are distinguished, though it seems clear that they are regarded differently by participants.

Recall that for Turiel, criterion judgments for the moral domain are: (1) generalizable; (2) unconditionally obligatory; (3) generally regarded as more serious than conventional judgments; and, (4) relating to concepts of welfare, fairness, and rights. It will be helpful to consider each of these in developing a modified version of the distinction.

Although it is incorrect to say that only issues involving harming innocent victims, welfare, fairness, and rights evoke the moral response, these cases do reliably evoke that response, so the Turiel characterization is not completely wide off the mark on this point. To amend the original Turiel characterization, I think it would be best to say that issues relating to harming innocent victims, welfare, fairness, and rights consistently evoke the moral response, though other issues can and do evoke the moral response as well. The evidence amassed so far suggests that, except in certain cases, issues unrelated to these
concepts consistently evoke the conventional response. The exceptions I have considered involved things such as disgust, purity/sanctity, and in-group out-group relations. Nichols (2002 and 2004) and Haidt and Bjorklund (2008) offer some suggestions for why other issues sometimes evoke the moral response. A critical evaluation of these works is beyond the scope of this paper, though I am somewhat skeptical whether the authors’ theories can account for the consistency of the distinction’s application in paradigm cases and the inconsistency of its application in borderline cases.

I am less optimistic that we can preserve the idea that moral judgments are generally regarded as more serious. This claim is quite vague and it is unclear whether it tells us anything important about the moral and conventional domains. Moreover, it is easy to think of examples that do not fit the pattern. To borrow an example from Prinz (2008, p.384), one might judge public displays of nudity as more serious than eating the last available cookie without offering to share, but still regard the former case as merely a matter of convention and the latter as a moral issue.

The core of the distinction, in my view, has to do with which judgments are regarded as “generalizable” and “unconditionally obligatory.” But as I argued in section IV A, to apply these terms to moral judgments is not to say that they are entirely context-independent.21

If my argument in section IV A is on track, we must take “generalizable” to mean that moral judgments generalize to cases similar in all morally relevant respects. One might argue that this definition blurs the distinction between the moral and conventional domains, because it seems one could likewise say that conventional judgments generalize to cases similar in all conventionally relevant respects. Answering this objection requires elaborating on the conditions under which moral and conventional judgments generalize.

This problem can best be approached by considering what it means to say moral judgments are unconditionally obligatory, because I think it is this feature of moral judgments that causes them to generalize in a way that is distinct from the way conventional judgments generalize. The important difference between moral and conventional judgments is that the conditions under which the latter judgments apply is determined entirely by what the authorities, rules, customs, etc., determine to be okay or not okay for a specific context. For example, the judgment that it is wrong to place one’s

21. If what I have said about rules so far is on track, it should be clear that everything I say here is compatible with a rule-based account of moral judgments. As I have said, there may be contextual assumptions built into the rules or they may be arranged in some sort of hierarchy that determines when a given lower order rule is applicable.
fork on the right side of one’s plate generalizes to all cultures in which authorities, rules, customs, etc., say that forks should be placed on the left.

We need to be careful not to think that what authorities, rules, customs, etc., determine to be appropriate for a specific context is never morally relevant. As I argued in my discussion of Kelly et al.’s results, people may think certain acts are generally okay but wrong when they are forbidden by political authorities. The key point, however, is that the acts are regarded as wrong not simply because authorities say they are wrong, but because of moral judgments that are authority independent. For example, the judgment that it is generally wrong to disobey reasonably just political authorities holds irrespective of what authorities say about the matter. To be clear, then, although some of the contextual considerations that determine when moral judgments apply are such that what authorities, rules, customs, etc., say may impact what is okay or not okay in a specific context, these contextual considerations are authority independent, i.e., they apply whether or not authorities, rules, customs, etc., say they apply.

If am correct, then moral judgments are, properly speaking, authority independent, but given the complicated relationship between moral judgments and authority, I believe the term “unconditionally obligatory” is preferable. Of course, this term can also be misleading if taken to mean that moral judgments such as “it is wrong to lie” apply in every possible circumstance. However, this confusion can be avoided if we keep in mind that moral judgments contain some contextual assumptions, if only implicitly. Furthermore, given that some authors have claimed that judgments may be authority independent without being generalizable, the term unconditionally obligatory has the virtue of suggesting a tight relationship between the two criterion judgments, a relationship which is supported by a broad range of data.

If these points are correct and moral judgments have a more complex relationship to authority and context than previously supposed, we have prima facie evidence that the distinction is abstract and sophisticated. With this point in mind, I will turn now to the question of whether the moral/conventional distinction could plausibly be acquired by all children in the normal course of development without any domain-specific cognitive structures.

6. The Moral/Conventional Distinction and PoS Arguments
Some empiricists accept that the moral/conventional distinction is conceptually real but argue that the moral “data” available to children is sufficient for them to develop this distinction without any domain specific faculty. I believe it is highly implausible to think
that children are capable of the kind of meta-cognizing required to form a distinction between the moral and conventional domains and that, consequently, the fact that children as young as 3 ½-years-old employ this distinction is the right kind of evidence for a PoS argument.

A. Empiricist Explanations

Jesse Prinz (2008) argues for an empiricist view of the moral domain and attempts to undermine a variety of nativist arguments. Although Prinz has expressed skepticism about whether the moral/conventional distinction is real, he has claimed that even if it is real, there is a plausible empiricist explanation for how children acquire the distinction.

According to Prinz, children come to acquire the distinction because, while parents do not explicitly teach it to their children, parents do treat violations of moral and conventional rules differently. Along with Kelly and Stitch, Prinz treats the distinction as a distinction between rules. He assumes along with researchers in the Turiel tradition that these two domains of rules are associated with different patterns of reasoning, patterns exhibited by children and adults. Prinz argues that if parents exhibit different reasoning patterns for violations of moral and conventional rules, children will be exposed to these different reasoning patterns and be able to “imitate” and “internalize” them. He cites a number of studies which suggest that parents adapt their disciplinary measures to the kinds of rules their children violate. Moral rule violations, he claims, “are likely to be enforced using power assertion and appeals to rights, and conventional rules are likely to be enforced by reasoning and appeals to social order” (392).

Prinz’s argument seeks to establish two key claims. First, that the moral data available to children is not impoverished because parents consistently treat violations of moral and conventional rules differently. Second, that the moral/conventional distinction children employ is entirely the result of their using general purpose learning systems to internalize this data and imitate the reasoning patterns exhibited by their parents. I think both claims are problematic.

B. Problems for Empiricist Explanations

The first problem with Prinz’s account is that it seems to assume that parents discipline their children in a highly systematic and consistent manner. He is, of course, right to point out that if the moral/conventional distinction is a real conceptual distinction, it will be exhibited in the reasoning patterns of adults. However, as Dwyer (2008, 416) explains, some parents treat violations of conventional rules very seriously. Furthermore, even if most parents think that, say, hitting is worse than failing to clean up some food spilled on the floor, parents are often tired and stressed and can become angry over anything
their children do. It seems highly unlikely that parents’ emotional attitudes with respect to violations of moral and conventional rules differ significantly and consistently enough to provide children with a robust distinction that they can imitate and internalize. Prinz’s claim looks even more dubious in light of the fact that in the normal course of development, all children employ the distinction consistently in paradigm cases at an early age. For his account to have any plausibility, it must be the case that all parents discipline their children consistently along the lines Prinz suggests.

Another serious challenge for empiricist accounts such as the one Prinz gives relates to the fact that we employ the moral/conventional distinction to make judgments about other individuals’ use of the distinction. For instance, we might call someone who treats rules about how to properly set a table as moral rules an “over-moralizer.” In calling someone an over-moralizer, we seem to be making some kind of normative judgment to the effect that they are moralizing something which they ought not moralize. The fact that individuals disagree about which judgments ought to be regarded as moral and which ought to be regarded as conventional helps drive home the point that there are not clear labels for which things belong in which category. For empiricists, this presents an acute challenge because they must explain how young children grasp the distinction sufficiently well to apply it consistently in paradigm cases when the categories “moral” and “conventional” are not clearly laid out in children’s experience.

These difficulties for empiricist accounts of the development of the moral/conventional distinction suggest that it is the right kind of evidence for a PoS argument. If, at an early age, children across cultures employ a distinction that they could not plausibly have learned from the evidence available to them, we have good reason to believe that domain-specific cognitive structures are involved in the development and use of this distinction.

7. Conclusion

In order for the moral/conventional distinction to provide nativists with a compelling line of evidence for a PoS Argument, it must meet two conditions. First, unsurprisingly, it must at least be a real conceptual distinction. Second, it must be the kind of distinction that could not plausibly be acquired simply through experience and general purpose learning systems.

I have argued that the moral/conventional distinction meets both conditions. The large body of work generated by Turiel and his followers provides strong evidence that the distinction is recognized early by children across cultures. The work of Haidt, Nichols, and
Kelly et al. suggests that certain elements of the distinction need to be refined. We need to make clear that characterizing moral judgments as generalizable and unconditionally obligatory/authority independent does not mean they are insensitive to context. We also need to recognize that participants’ judgments exhibit a considerable degree of uniformity in paradigm moral and conventional cases and that there are a number of borderline cases in which judgments do not exhibit such uniformity. The upshot, in my view, is that the moral/conventional distinction is both vague and sophisticated. It is vague because the consistency with which it is applied breaks down in borderline cases, and sophisticated because the distinction seems to be specified in terms of abstract and subtle principles regarding the conditions under which judgments generalize and the relationship between judgments and authorities.

I believe the second condition is also met. Here, the relevant facts are that the distinction appears early, in children as young as 3½ years old, and across cultures, where children are exposed to a wide range of moral upbringings. If I am right that the distinction is abstract and sophisticated, we have further evidence for the nativist position since, all other things being equal, the more complex the moral “output” the less likely it is that children are able to learn the distinction using only general purposing learning systems and the moral data plausibly available to them.

Further investigations will hopefully shed more light on the role this distinction plays in our judgments. I want to be clear that I have only offered a preliminary sketch of how the moral/conventional distinction might break down. If I am right in thinking that the moral/conventional distinction is highly abstract and sophisticated, future studies should be careful not to draw overly simplistic conclusions about what is going on in participants’ minds/brains when they seem to regard certain judgments differently than others. It would be helpful to examine more closely participants’ beliefs about the ways in which moral and conventional judgments generalize and their relationship to context and authorities. Future studies should also try to get a clearer idea of what the paradigmatic cases are and what it is about the “borderline cases” that causes the distinction to break down when applied to them.

References


